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Sociology

Rocky Mountain Laboratories: An Inquiry into Community Opposition to a Biosafety
Level IV Expansion
Chairperson: Rebecca T. Richards

fdlL-

This study explores the perspectives o f community members opposed to a federal
biolaboratory expansion at Rocky M ountain Laboratories in Hamilton, Montana. The
biolaboratory expansion includes the construction o f Biosafety Level IV laboratories,
which are facilities equipped to study the m ost deadly infectious diseases known to man.
The biolaboratory expansion is funded by federal bioterrorism research monies so that
potential bioterrorist biological agents m ay be studied in this expanded facility.
High risk hazardous facilities are defined as those that rely on technology and evoke
high levels o f dread. Community reactions to high risk hazardous facilities, including
hazardous waste, nuclear, and mining facilities, have been widely examined. However,
community response to biolaboratories, potentially another type o f a high risk hazardous
facility, has yet to be examined. Thus, the purpose o f this study is to explore the degree
to which a biolaboratory m ay be perceived as another type o f a high risk hazardous
facility. This exploratory study examines if participants’ opposition to a biolaboratory
reflects previous findings on community response to other types o f high risk hazardous
facilities.
In-depth interviews with 10 community members opposed to the biolaboratory
expansion allowed me to explore their perspectives on this unexamined topic. The data
collected from these in-depth interviews were analyzed by content analysis that included
two stages: open coding and axial coding. The results o f this process revealed that
various themes were found to characterize participants’ opposition to the biolaboratory
expansion. These multidimensional themes included a negative perception o f the
expansion approval process, distrust in institutional authority, a negative perception o f
potential risks, and distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research. Unidimensional
themes included a negative perception o f the equity o f expansion and a perceived lack o f
economic benefits from expansion. However, the extent to which each theme influenced
each participant’s opposition varied.
Participants’ opposition to the biolaboratory expansion was found to reflect other
community responses to high risk hazardous facilities. Unlike previously determined
community response to high risk hazardous facilities, participants’ opposition was
characterized by a strong negative perception o f the public process and questioning o f
bioterrorism research. Thus, the results o f this exploratory suggest that to some extent
comm unity residents perceive biolaboratories as a unique type o f a high risk hazardous
facility.
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C H A P T E R O N E - IN T R O D U C T IO N

The terrorist attacks on Septem ber 11, 2001 in the United States prompted
heightened concern over the safety of the nation. One concern was the possibility that
infectious diseases could be used as deadly weapons by terrorists. Shortly after this
pivotal event. President George W . Bush approved a $6 billion federal allocation increase
for bioterrorism protection (McKee 2002). Of this $6 billion increase, nearly $1.7 billion
was designated for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for
bioterrorism research since the purpose of the NIAID is to “conduct and support research
that strives to understand, treat, and ultimately prevent the myriad of infectious,
immunologic, and allergic diseases that threaten hundreds of millions of people
worldwide” (NIAID 2004a).
The increased bioterrorism monies will be used by the NIAID to expand research
in biolaboratories. In these facilities, scientists can study potential terrorist biological
agents, such as anthrax and Ebola. Across the United States, the NIAID is investing the
bioterrorism monies in its various intramural and extramural research facilities.
Intramural research is conducted by federal scientists at NIAID laboratories in Bethesda
and Rockville, MD and Hamilton, MT (NIAID 2004a). The NIAID also supports
extramural research, which includes research conducted by non-federal employees in
various universities, medical schools, hospitals, and research institutions (NIAID 2004a).
The NIAID will spend a portion of the bioterrorism research monies in the
construction and expansion of research facilities. NIAID plans to construct and expand
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research facilities have sparked concern in several potentially affected communities,
including Boston, MA, Davis, CA, and Hamilton, MT.
This study examines one potentially affected community, Hamilton, Montana,
where some residents formed a grassroots opposition against the federal biolaboratory
expansion. Since 1927, Rocky M ountain Laboratories (RML) in Hamilton, M ontana has
pursued infectious disease research funded by the federal government and funneled
through its parent agency, the NIAID. The current expansion project at RML, the
Integrated Research Facility (IRF), will include a Biosafety Level IV research laboratory.
The IRF is funded by the bioterrorism monies appropriated to the NIAID in 2001. The
purpose o f this study is to describe community opposition during the period of proposed
expansion from January 2002 through June 2004 to the IRF project at RML.
B iosafety L ab o rato ries
Currently, there are four classifications of research laboratories operated by the
NIAID from Biosafety Level (BSL) I to IV. According to the NIAID (2004b), “scientists
use biosafety labs to study contagious materials safely and effectively. These state-of-the
art labs are designed to not only protect the researcher from contamination, but also to
prevent microorganisms from entering the environment.” Each BSL classification is
determined according to “laboratory techniques, safety equipment, and design, depending
on the types of agents being studied” (NIAID 2004b). With each increasing level, the
risk to human health from the agents studied in the laboratory increases, with level IV
being the most hazardous (see Appendix A).
Scientists use the most stringent procedures to protect themselves and the public
from the deadly diseases studied in a BSL IV laboratory. For example, in a BSL IV
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laboratory, scientists wear protective suits that filter the air and multiple levels of security
to protect the lab, including security cameras and card reader identification systems that
admit only approved personnel (NIAID 2004b). Currently, there are four BSL IV
laboratories in the United States; these four facilities are located in Atlanta, GA,
Frederick, MD, San Antonio, XX, and Galveston, XX (NIAID 2004b). RML in
Hamilton, MX will become the fifth location in the United States with a BSL IV
laboratory.
T heoretical B ackground
High levels of anxiety, such as community concern over the potential impacts o f a
BSL IV laboratory, may be explained by risk society theory. Risk society theory, as
suggested by Ulrich Beck (1992), is based on the idea that risk is manufactured and
managed by society. Risks are not increasingly present, but rather society is organized to
respond to risk (Irwin 2001). Xhe risk society theory claims that doubt, dread, and
uncertainty prevail because society has become consumed with managing complex and
obscure risks.
Xhe emergence of the risk society is an outcome of modern, industrial society’s
success (Irwin 2001). Xhe focus of industrial society has been the production and
consumption of goods to overcome scarcity, which is the perceived need or lack of goods
(Van Loon 2002). In modern industrial society, continuous technological progress is
needed to create more goods for production and consumption. Institutions of the modem
society focus on production and consumption; however, latent side effects are
unaddressed by established institutions (Van Loon 2002).
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The manufactured, latent side effects created by the success o f modem industrial
society are the “bads” or risks that threaten society and the environment (Van Loon
2002). Risks are “industrially produced, economically externalized, juridically
individualized, and scientifically legitimized” (Beck as cited in Irwin 2001:61). Beck (in
Van Loon 2002) frequently uses nuclear technology to illustrate the latent side effects of
modern society. Nuclear technology has been used to create electric power; however, the
nuclear accident at Chernobyl exemplifies how this technology can produce risks that
harm society and the environment (Van Loon 2002).
As the risks of modern society have become increasingly recognized, institutions
have attempted to focus on not only the production of goods but also the accompanying
externalities. The degree of excess “bads” produced by modernity has overwhelmed
institutions that in turn can only create more risks for society (Van Loon 2002).
Hence, risks are no longer mere side effects of production and consumption; they
have become the central focus of society. The risk society is thus “an epoch in which the
dark sides of progress increasingly come to dominate social debate” (Beck in Irwin
2001:50). Class, inequality, scarcity, and other issues are still important; however, risk
has become the central focus of institutions. Risks may not affect everyone in society
equally since new patterns and inequalities of risk exposure continually emerge (Irwin
2001). According to risk society theory, conflict in society is no longer based on the
distribution of wealth but on the distribution of risk. A key focus of the risk society is to
manage the manufactured risks that are frequently invisible, ubiquitous, and deadly. Risk
society theory seeks to explain why institutions have adopted a heightened concern for
regulating risk, especially since many risks are not new.
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Risk society theory raises questions about the adequacy of institutions,
specifically science and technology, to handle risk. These institutions have a dual role
since they not only generate various risks but they also seek to solve and understand risks
(Van Loon 2002). As institutions struggle to understand risk by using inadequate tools,
they may frequently even amplify risk induced problems (Van Loon 2002). Science is
oriented toward understanding “the definition and distribution of errors and risk which
are produced by its e lf’ (Irwin 2001:57). Meanwhile, scientific experts are expected to
reduce risks; although they frequently fail (Irwin 2001). Therefore, individual citizens
are skeptical of scientific experts and are hence laden with the burden of evaluating risk
(Van Loon 2002). Thus, managing risks has become a personal and private
responsibility. Overall, the risk society is characterized by a loss of faith in institutions
and experts to effectively manage and respond to risks.
The threat of infectious diseases, especially those spread through bioterrorism,
may thus be understood through the risk society theory. Like risks produced from
industrialized production, emerging infectious diseases evoke dread and fear. As a latent
side effect of industrial production, such diseases can be distributed globally by mass
transportation systems. Infectious diseases are unpredictable, difficult to control, and
highly lethal. If infectious diseases were to be used by terrorists as weapons, the outcome
could be disastrous. Concern about bioterrorism has propelled the need for research on
potential terrorist weapons in biolaboratories. Thus, consistent with the risk society, risk
has become institutionalized. As bioterrorism research is institutionalized, scientists in
biolaboratories have begun to examine how to control and cure potential bioterrorist
weapons. Thus, society can better respond to potential bioterrorism risks.
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However, biolaboratories have a dual role according to the risk society theory.
On one hand, biolaboratories will allow scientists to understand bioterrorism weapons;
simultaneously, biolaboratories also generate various risks. In a risk society, “the
technosciense cannot be constrained within laboratories, even if safely sealed off in
biohazard phase-four labs” (Van Loon 2002:142). Can biolaboratories properly contain
potential bioterrorism diseases? Can technology and scientific experts manage potential
bioterrorism diseases? Thus, the risk society theory raises questions about the adequacy
of biolaboratories to handle risk.
B io lab o ratories: A New Species of T rouble?
Erikson (1994) has suggested that society is plagued by a “new species of
trouble.” According to Erikson (1994), technology designed to protect society from
“natural disasters” has created a whole new category of “technological disasters” .
Technological disasters are unique because they are created by humans and thus
preventable. Erikson (1994) suggests society is increasingly enduring more technological
disasters that involve radiation and chemical accidents and other toxic emergencies.
Natural disasters, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, have a distinct beginning and
ending, whereas technological disasters are endless and without boundaries. Therefore,
these technological disasters provoke dread and uncertainty. Hence, are biolaboratories
becoming a “new species of trouble”? The purpose of this study is to explore the degree
to which a biolaboratory is perceived to be a high risk hazardous facility by some
community members of Hamilton, Montana.
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C H A P T E R T W O - H IS T O R IC A L B A C K G R O U N D

RM L occupies 66 acres o f a residential neighborhood in Hamilton, Montana. The
purpose o f RM L is to conduct research to “understand, treat, and ultimately prevent the
myriad of infectious, immunologic, and allergic diseases” that threaten society (NIAID
2004a), W hy is a federal biolaboratory located in the remote state of Montana, many
miles from a large research center or city?
T he E arly D ays 1880 th ro u g h 1910
In the late 1880s, a strange, new illness Rocky Mountain spotted fever, which is
commonly shortened to “spotted fever”, infected early settlers of the Bitterroot Valley in
western M ontana (Harden 1990). The illness was not a widespread problem until the
1890s; however, the first documented case most likely occurred in 1882 (Harden 1990
and Philip 2000). Spotted fever was most prevalent from 1900 to 1910, when 141 cases
were reported in the Bitterroot Valley (see Appendix B). At this time, the illness was not
recognized as a distinct disease and was frequently given various names including
measles, black measles, black typhus fever, mountain fever, and fever (Philip 2000).
Although spotted fever was later discovered to be caused by a rickettsia, a bacteria
carried by ticks, at the time Ravalli and M issoula County Boards of Health believed that
it resulted from a parasite in melting snow water (Philip 2000).
The symptoms of spotted fever begin a week or two after the victim has been
bitten by a tick, and the onset of the symptoms can either occur suddenly or emerge
slowly (Harden 1990). The first symptom of the disease is a headache followed by pains
in the back, joints, and legs; the eyes are sensitive to light and often a stiff neck occurs
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(Harden 1990). Additionally, the patient develops a fever, cannot sleep well, and is very
restless (Harden 1990). Spotted fever is also characterized by a rash that covers the entire
body; however, in severe cases victims may die before the rash appears (Harden 1990).
Victims that have recovered from spotted fever in the Bitterroot Valley usually have been
sick for approximately two weeks (Harden 1990).
In 1902, Louis B. Wilson and W illiam M. Chowning were the first researchers to
investigate the disease (Harden 1990). They compiled a comprehensive list of the
number of cases in the Bitterroot Valley by examining newspapers and requesting records
from area doctors (Harden 1990). W ilson and Chowning found that at least 88 cases were
reported between 1895 and 1902 in the valley (Harden 1990). Although the number of
cases concerned residents, doctors, and public health officials, a more troubling aspect of
the disease was its high mortality rate of over 70% (Harden 1990). Additionally, Wilson
and Chowning found that most of the cases of spotted fever occurred between 15 May
and 15 June and most frequently occurred in healthy males aged 20 to 40 years (Harden
1990).
W ilson and Chowning also discovered that all of the reported cases of spotted
fever occurred west of the Bitterroot River. Proximity to the foothills was also a factor;
as one resident commented, “exposure or residence on the ‘bench’ might for some reason
be more dangerous than in other near places (of the river) because of the difference in the
development” (Harden 1990:26). The majority of the spotted fever cases occurred “near
western fringes of the Bitterroot Valley from Lost Horse Creek in the south to Lolo Creek
in the North” although cases were also found across western Montana, specifically in
Missoula and Granite Counties (Philip 2000:59).
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Beyond the state of Montana, spotted fever also occurred in other western states
including Idaho, Oregon, W yoming, W ashington, Utah, Nevada, California, and
Colorado (Harden 1990). In most cases, the disease was not severe and rarely deadly, so
that it was never investigated by public health officials. However, the unique severity of
spotted fever in the Bitterroot Valley motivated the State of M ontana Board of Health to
support fever research by recruiting W ilson and Chowning from M innesota (Harden
2000). The future of spotted fever research in western Montana would henceforth
continue to be dominated by non-local experts. By 1909, Howard Taylor Rickets, a
young scientist from The University of Chicago, discovered that the infectious agent of
spotted fever was carried by ticks (Philip 2000). Rickets’ quest to develop a vaccine for
the disease was hampered by funding delays from the state of Montana; in 1910, Rickets
died from typhus in M exico and vaccine development was halted (Philip 2000).
S potted fever and developm ent 1890 th ro u g h 1920
The impact o f spotted fever on the development of the Bitterroot Valley was
widespread and lengthy. Once spotted fever was identified as a specific disease of the
Bitterroot Valley, the future of economic development in the area was of great concern to
residents and developers. As Harden (1990:22) noted “this dread disease seemed a
particularly cruel blight on the future development of one of the most beautiful Valleys in
the western United States.” Efforts were made by local development supporters to ignore
the disease. For example, in 1904, all subsequent spotted fever deaths were not
distinguished from other illnesses in local newspaper obituaries (Harden 1990).
From the late 1890s until the 1920s, economic development in the Bitterroot
Valley was primarily based on logging and apple orchards. Railroad construction

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
between 1887 and 1888 linked the Bitterroot Valley’s abundant timber to outside
markets, and the resulting logging boom occurred directly after completion of the railroad
(Philip 2000). During the logging boom, large trees o f value were removed while slash
remained behind because it was costly, laborious to remove, and lacked market value
(Philip 2000). By 1899, a total of 500 million board feet was cut from the valley and
shipped to the Anaconda Copper Mining Company to fuel mining operations in Butte and
Anaconda, M ontana (Philip 2000). In 1890, the Bitterroot Development Company
(BRDC) was formed and supported by the owner of Anaconda Copper Mining Company,
M arcus Daly (Philip 2000). To support the vast amount of timber harvested in the
Bitterroot Valley, the BRDC built a new sawmill in Hamilton in 1890 (Philip 2000).
In the early 1890s, new apple orchards were planted in the cleared lands west of
the Bitterroot River because land developers claimed the valley provided optimal
growing conditions for apple trees. Between 1895 and 1896, nearly 50,000 apple trees
were planted (Philip 2000). The Bitterroot District Irrigation Company provided water
for agricultural lands by building the “big ditch canal”, a system beginning at the
constructed Lake Como dam south of Hamilton (Philip 2000:95).
Spotted fever threatened railroad and orchard development in the Bitterroot
Valley. The Northern Pacific Hospital room in Missoula, Montana was made available
for Wilson and Chowning (Harden 1990). Harden (1990: 25) noted that “the railroad
company was eager to assist in the spotted fever investigations, because the expansion of
its rail lines into Idaho was jeopardized by the disease, as was its supply of lumber for
ties from the Bitterroot.” Developers from Chicago sold orchards by advertising in
Chicago newspapers, and their profits were threatened by the disease.
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Spotted fever negative publicity threatened growth in the Bitterroot Valley. In
1907, land prices in the Bitterroot Valley ranged from $100 to $150 an acre; by 1921, in
some areas o f the valley, land prices had dropped to $15 an acre (Harden 1990). Real
estate salesmen from Chicago emphasized that the disease was located only west of the
river to “m inim ize the impact of spotted fever on land sales with tangible proof that the
entire valley was not affected” (Harden 1990:63). Ironically the very emergence of the
disease could have resulted from the valley’s growth and economic development, since
cleared land may have provided optimal conditions for the probable increase in small
animals and ticks.*
By 1913, progress in understanding and controlling spotted fever in rural Montana
was hindered because o f a power struggle between entomologists and physicians. The
battle between these two professional groups revolved around the unanswered question:
was spotted fever an insect problem or a human problem? The M ontana State Board of
Entomology was established in 1913 and immediately began disease prevention and
eradication efforts (Harden 1990). The physicians and entomologists agreed to divide the
Bitterroot Valley into two sections, one for entomologists and the other physicians
(Harden 1990). Between 1911 and 1920, the main focus of both groups of professionals
was tick eradication that was attempted by “dipping” livestock in arsenic baths to remove
ticks and by killing rodents with poison (Harden 1990). In 1913, local ranchers’
resentment of livestock dipping programs was highlighted by the destruction of two
dipping vats in the Bitterroot Valley (Philip 2000). Tick eradication efforts decreased the

’ T h e increased occurrence o f spotted fever coincided with railroad construction, loggin g, and hom estead
d evelop m en t. Philip (2 0 0 0 :5 5 ) su ggests that the “developm ent o f the outbreak and its subsequent decline
w ere greatly influenced by the events and environm ental changes associated with settlem ent o f the
B itterroot V a lley .”
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num ber of ticks in the Bitterroot Valley; however, the disease remained rampant in the
mountain canyons (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.^).
R M L 1920 th ro u g h 1940s
In 1921, State Senator Tyler W orden and his wife, Carrie, the President of the
M ontana Federation of W om en’s Clubs, died from spotted fever near Lolo, Montana
(Kalisch 1973). The loss of this prominent couple caused a huge uproar in Missoula and
the Bitterroot Valley (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). Dr. Parker, with the aid of several
M issoula and Bitterroot Valley organizations, appealed to the Montana Legislature for
increased spotted fever research funds (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). As a result, an
abandoned schoolhouse near Hamilton was obtained by the state for spotted fever
research.
In 1925, a vaccine for the disease was created by U.S. Public Health physician
Roscoe R. Spencer and M ontana entomologist Ralph R. Parker at the Hamilton facility
(Harden 1990). The vaccine was made from ground-up ticks infected with spotted fever.
In 1925, 34 people were inoculated with the vaccine, and they experienced only minor
side effects (Harden 1990). The following year, 400 people were inoculated; the vaccine
didn’t protect people from acquiring the disease, but it did decrease disease severity
(Harden 1990).
Vaccination production in the transformed schoolhouse was very dangerous.
Moreover, the facility was inadequate for hazardous vaccine production. At the time, the
laboratory employed 16 staff; during the previous five years, 11 of the workers had
developed spotted fever or tularemia, another tick borne disease most likely obtained

* A ll sources w ho were inlerview ed as background informants on the history o f RM L have been
assign ed pseudonym s to insure their anonym ity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
from laboratory rabbits, guinea pigs, and other small animals used to produce the vaccine
(Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). Two staff members died from spotted fever, and one died from
tularem ia (Philip 1990).
W ith the support of the M ontana State Board of Entomology, in 1927 the
M ontana Legislature appropriated $60,000 for new laboratory construction (Harden
1990). Once funding became available, the next concern was: where should the
laboratory be located? Laboratory employees wanted it built at the University of
M ontana since M issoula was larger than Hamilton and Roscoe R. Spencer argued “the
infected ticks posed no threat to the campus” (Harden 1990; 139). However, the Montana
State Board of Entomology wanted the facility closer to the Bitterroot Valley. The
board’s position prevailed when the Hamilton Chamber of Commerce purchased land in
Hamilton and donated it for the new laboratory (Harden 1990).
Some residents in Hamilton opposed the new laboratory construction. Residents
of the Pine Grove addition, where the laboratory was eventually built, did not want it in
their neighborhood. As soon as the announcement was made, “there was an outcry” by
residents in the Pine Grove neighborhood (Philip 2000:152). Opponents claimed that
building the laboratory on the east side of the river, where spotted fever did not exist,
would spread the disease and decrease property values. The April headlines of Western
News declared opponents “D on’t W ant East Side Tick House” (Philip 2000). The
Bitterroot Irrigation District filed a lawsuit that represented 400 owners of irrigated farm
land. However, the case was dismissed and the laboratory was constructed (Philip 2000).
In 1928, the laboratory construction was completed (Philip 2000).
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Although opponents failed to stop laboratory construction, the new building
emphasized “containm ent” as recommended by concerned community members (Philip
1990). Improvements included rounded corners to eliminate tick hiding places and a
chain-link fence and moat surrounded the property “to prevent escape of ticks and
trespass by animals and small boys” (Philip 1990:153-4). Vaccine production was
confined to the third floor, and regulations for entering the facilities were established
(Philip 1990). After the laboratory construction, additional safety improvements were
made to fix several problems. For example, ticks escaped from non-sealed windows and
the air ventilation system spewed ticks out of the laboratory, thus window and ventilation
replacements were installed (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). In one incident, laboratory
monkeys escaped from their cages, existed through an open window, and climbed into
cedar trees on RML property (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.) Therefore, new monkey-proof
locks were used to secure the cages.
In 1932, spotted fever appeared in the eastern part of the United States; suddenly,
vaccine production became a nation-wide concern. As a result, the federal government
purchased the laboratory from the state of Montana and incorporated it into the Public
Health Service (Philip 1990). An additional building was completed in 1934, and the
facility was officially named Rocky Mountain Laboratory (Philip 1990). In 1937, RML
became part of the National Institutes o f Health (NIH).
Expansion o f the facility continued when 26 acres were bought in 1938 to serve as
a buffer zone between the laboratory and residential neighborhoods (Philip 1990). In
1939, a third building, a 100-foot smokestack for the oil-heating plant, and two
residences, for RML scientists Dr. Parker and Dr. Cox, were constructed (Ravalli
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Republic 1939). After the expansions were completed, RM L was described as “the bestequipped biological laboratory unit in the United States” (Ravalli Republic 1939). It
included air-conditioning and “every modern factor for science workers” (Ravalli
Republic 1939). At the time, it was the second largest government owned public health
facility in the world (Ravalli Republic 1939). Additionally, a fourth building was
completed the following year (Philip 1990). During this period, RM L employed 116
people who studied various tick and insect bom diseases (Philip 1990). The laboratory,
with the exception of vaccine production areas, was open to the public and visitors
frequently toured the facility (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). Local residents used the RML
library and children visited their parents there after school (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.).
In 1938, RML scientist Dr. Herald Cox discovered that spotted fever could be
grown in yolk sacs of embryonic chicken eggs; thus, the dangerous method of vaccine
production from ground-up infested ticks was discontinued (Philip 1990). During World
W ar II, RML produced yellow fever, typhus, and spotted fever vaccines for the U.S.
military forces (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). In 1949, RML director Dr. Parker died at a time
when spotted fever was diminishing across the country. As the “Parker era” of spotted
fever research was ending, the future of RML was unclear (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.).
R M L 1950s th ro u g h 1980
In the 1950s, RM L experienced massive changes. The NIH had established
another research center with a practical research focus; therefore, the NIH needed RML
to shift from practical to basic research (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). In 1955, the NIH
established a branch called the National Microbiological Institute which subsequently
was renamed the National Institution of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), and
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RM L became its largest field laboratory that was mandated to study infectious and
tropical diseases (Philip 1990). The new director, Carl Larson, brought new people to
RM L and expanded the laboratory’s research agenda (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.; Dr.
M organ, pers.comm.). Although the laboratory continued to focus on diseases contracted
from ticks, general confusion about the direction of RML prevailed (Dr. Huber,
pers.comm.; Dr. M organ, pers.comm.). New, basic scientists from fields such as
microbiology and m olecular biology began studying tuberculosis, whooping cough,
rabies, and other related diseases (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.; Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.).
Overall, the research direction at RML changed from one that was field oriented to one
that was grounded in the basic scientific research of infectious diseases (Philip 1990).
Research at RM L continued to expand during the 1960s without major
improvements to laboratory equipment and other resources (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.).
Scientists were allowed to work in many different disciplines, but research was often
conducted in very “primitive conditions’’ (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). Public access was
still available in designated areas; for example, local high school students used the library
for schoolwork (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). Safety remained a concern at the laboratory.
One former scientist described how laboratory infections were common and almost
“everyone eventually got Q fever’’ (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.).^ Local laundry workers,
who were employed outside of the laboratory, became sick with Q fever from
contaminated laundry (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). Safety precautions at the laboratory
continuously evolved and improved, in part guided by lessons learned from these events.

^ The respiratory d isease, R ickettsia b u rn eti, com m only called Q fever, is transmitted from infected
laboratory anim als. It is highly infectious and cau ses flu-like sym ptom s (Philip 2000). A lthough RM L
e m p lo y ees received a vaccine as protection against the d isease, many still contracted Q fever (Dr. Huber,
pers.com m .).
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In the 1970s, RM L experienced m ajor changes in research programs and staff.
During this time, “out moded methods of research at the lab were done away with and the
scientific staff underwent a major turnover” (Wiens 1982). The administration was
“reinvented”, as efforts were made to bring the laboratory “into the cutting edge” of
science (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). At this time, tick research at RML was minimized.
(Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). RML was expanded and upgraded; workers were formed into
three separate research departments (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). A group of scientific
counselors made annual visits to review and determine how research should progress at
the laboratory (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.; Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). Nearly half of the staff
changed at RML, some through retirements, and through the hiring of “new, younger
scientists” (Wiens 1982). The new trend at the laboratory was to have a few tenured
scientists and many short-term, post-doc tori al researchers (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). As
a result, new people arrived to work at RM L for shorter periods of time and were less
involved with the local community (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.).
R M L 1980 through early 2000
In 1982, federal laboratory officials declared that the future of RML was
optimistic, “despite rumors to the contrary” (Wiens 1982). At the time, the laboratory
was facing major funding cutbacks, but federal officials “refuted fears that the lab in
Hamilton would eventually be phased out of operation” (Wiens 1982). However, one
year later, a laboratory closure proposal threatened the future of RML (Towslee 1983a).
The Grace Commission, which evaluated government spending, recommended the
closure o f RM L and the transfer of its research activities to the NIH headquarters in
Bethesda, Maryland (Towslee 1983a). According to the Grace Commission, the closure
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o f RM L with its 130 employees would save the federal government $14.1 million over
three years (Towslee 2005b). The commission cited other reasons for closing RML
including the laboratory’s isolated location, its trouble attracting scientists, high travel
expenses, a lack of nearby facilities, its redundant research, and a lack of educational
opportunities for scientists (Towslee 1983a).
The potential shutdown of RM L was opposed by the Montana congressional
representation, local government officials, scientists, and local citizens (Dr. Johnson,
pers. comm.). Defenders of RML emphasized its research accomplishments, its
beneficial employment for the community, and the potential costs of relocating the
laboratory (Towslee 1983a and Wiens 1983). As a result, the Grace Commission
withdrew its closure recommendations (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.).
Suddenly, RM L not only survived potential closure, but funding was available for
expansions and upgrades (Towslee 1983b). During this time, new laboratory branches
were formed; consequently, the Rocky Mountain Laboratory was officially renamed
Rocky M ountain Laboratories to represent the various research foci; however, the
acronym RM L remained (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). RM L’s historical tick and vector
borne research was de-emphasized and the worlds’ largest collection of tick was
transferred from RML to the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D C. (Dr. Johnson,
pers. comm.). The 1980s was also a period of drastic safety improvements at the facility
because general scientific knowledge of experiment safety had led to codifying safety
equipment, procedures, and laboratories (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). For example, the
implementation of federal codification of biosafety levels regulated laboratory
experiments (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). Additionally, biological safety cabinets, which
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are steel compartm ents with filtered air that contain experiment agents, were built at
RM L (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.).
In the mid-1990s, some of the RML buildings did not meet federal safety codes;
therefore, several buildings were remodeled and another new building was constructed
(Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). The laboratory already operated at BSL I and II, but
additional BSL III laboratories were built in the late 1990s (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.).
In 1995, the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City impacted safety practices at
RML. As a federal facility, RM L safety measures were evaluated, and the subsequent
events o f September 11, 2001 provided funding for increased security measures (Dr.
Johnson, pers. comm.). Consequently, shortly after the terrorists’ attacks, a fence was
constructed around the RM L facility (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). Security was also
increased at the laboratory, with security personnel guarding the laboratory entrance and
restricting public access (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.).
Integrated Research Facility Expansion
Research, organization, and safety practices have evolved at RML over the past
80 years. Currently, the NIH consists of 27 institutes and centers, including the NIAID
(Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). The NIAID intramural research branch includes federal
scientists at RML, Bethesda and Rockville, Maryland, and small units abroad (Dr.
Johnson, pers. comm.). RM L is organized into five departments including the laboratory
of human bacteria pathogenesis, intracellular parasites, persistent viral diseases,
veterinarian branch, and administration/ facility management (Pekoe 2004; 11).
In 2002, construction of the Integrated Research Facility (IRF) was proposed. As
proposed, it included BSL IV research facilities and the $66.7 million construction of a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20
100,000 square foot building (NIAID 2004b). During the past 80 years, RM L has existed
in Ham ilton without any community-wide conflict, except for initial opposition to the
laboratory construction in 1927 (Dr. Huber, pers. comm.; Dr. Johnson, pers.comm.; Dr.
M organ, pers. comm.). However, the IRF sparked opposition, and many citizens have
voiced concerns against the BSL IV laboratory.
According to the NIAID, the construction of the IRF is needed to accomplish
R M L’s expanded mission. The N IA ID ’s mission has been expanded to “include basic
and applied research aimed at addressing specific issues outlined in the national bio
defense response plans” (NIAID 2004c). The NIAID has received an additional $1.7
billion congressional allocation, the largest budget increase in the institution’s history to
study “agents of bioterrorism” and make the “country better prepared” to reduce the
impact of potential bioterrorist attacks (NIAID 2004c). Additionally, the expanded
facilities are expected to “help develop new diagnostics, vaccines, and treatments for
diseases caused by emerging infections and the intentional release of an infectious agent
into a civilian population” (NIAID 2004c).
As proposed, the IRF would make RML the fifth operational BSL IV laboratory
in the United States. Other BSL IV facilities are currently located at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta GA, the United States Army Medical
Research Institute for Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Frederick MD, the
Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research in San Antonio TX, and the University
of Texas at Galveston TX (NIAID, 2004b). The cities currently hosting BSL IV
laboratories have populations ranging from 52,247 to over one million (see Table 1).
These four operational BSL IV laboratories are located in metropolitan counties; Ravalli
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County would become the first nonmetropolitan location for a BSL IV laboratory in the
United States. The population density in the counties where BSL IV laboratories are
currently located is between 912 and 2,964 persons per square mile. In comparison,
Ravalli County has a population density of only 18 persons per square mile.
Table 1. Population o f BSL IV host cities and counties in the U.S. (Source: U S.
Census 2000).
BSL IV location
Host City
Host City
Host County Host County
Population
Population
per square mi
Centers for Disease Atlanta,
416,474
DeKalb Co.
2,519
Control &
GA
Prevention
Rocky Mountain
Hamilton,
3,705
Ravalli Co.
18
Laboratory
MT
Southwest
San
1,144,646
Bexar Co.
1,011
Foundation for
Antonio,
Biomedical
TX
Research
University of Texas Galveston, 52,247
Galveston Co. 627
TX
U.S. Army Medical Frederick,
52,767
Frederick Co. 912
Research Institute
MD
for Infectious
Diseases

Construction of the IRF at RML would include laboratories, offices, conference
rooms, a lunch room, animal quarters, mechanical space, and a waste handling area
(NIAID 2004c). Several laboratories that would operate at the BSL IV level would
encompass 6,800 square feet of the entire 100,000 square foot facility. The BSL IV
laboratories would be surrounded by a corridor, which would provide a “buffer between
the lab and exterior” (NIAID 2004c). The two year construction project would include
nearly 200 workers during peak construction (NIAID 2004b). Payroll from the two year
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construction project is expected to reach $4.7 million that would produce a total of $18.9
million in local economic activity (NIAID 2004b).
RM L would also hire new employees to work in the expanded IRF. These jobs
would encourage more economic activity in the rapidly growing valley. During 1990 to
2000, Ravalli County experienced a 44.2% increase in population, the largest countywide population growth rate in Montana for the decade (U.S. Census 2000). Currently
255 people, 77 of whom have doctoral degrees, are employed at RM L with an average
salary of $41,600 (FitzSimmons 2004). Meanwhile, the average per capita income in
Montana is significantly less at $17,151 (U.S. Census 2000). Once the IRF opens, an
expected 100 new employees would work at RML and bring an additional 245 residents
to the Hamilton area (FitzSimmons 2004). An influx of new residents could increase
business and real estate earnings for the surrounding area. The payroll for the new
employees might amount to $6.6 million annual additional earnings to the current $10.4
million payroll (FitzSimmons 2004). For every 100 RML jobs, an estimated 40 jobs
would be created in Montana and for every $1 million in RML salaries, $600,000 in the
state-wide economy would be generated (Pekoe 2004).
Furthermore, RM L is a key contributor to the biotechnology industry that is an
important sector in the Montana economy. Concentrations of biotechnology facilities in
the state are about twice the national average (FitzSimmons 2004). In Montana, 110
biotechnology businesses were operating in 2004, and the industry experienced a 22%
growth rate from 1990 to 2000 (FitzSimmons 2004). The number of people employed
by the biotechnology industry could double in the next five to 10 years (FitzSimmons
2004).
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IRF approval process
Once the IRF at RM L was publicly announced in January 2002, community
opposition formed. The IRF approval process began in January, 2002 when the proposed
expansion facility was announced. A detailed timeline of the major events occurring
during the approval process is described in Table 2.
Table 2. IRF approval process timetable (Source: Compiled from newspaper
articles, opposition group websites, and meeting video recordings)._________________
Date
Event
January, 2002
IRF proposal announced
February, 2002
RM L public meeting about proposal
Summer, 2002
New opposition group formed
September, 2002 Environmental Assessment released
First RML Community Liaison Group meeting
October, 2002
January, 2003
RM L Town hall meeting
April, 2003
RM L open house
May, 2003
Draft Environmental Impact Statement released
Opposition groups’ public meeting
June, 2003
RM L public comment meeting
RM
L public comment meeting
July, 2003
September, 2003 RM L public comment meeting
RML Town hall meeting
December, 2003
Supplementary Draft Environmental Impact Statement released
April, 2004
Final Environmental Impact Statement released
One opposition group filed lawsuit against NIH for Freedom of
Information Act violation
RM L Record of Decision released
June, 2004
August, 2004
Opposition groups’ lawsuit filed against NIH to stop lab
construction
September, 2004 Settlement reached

Approximately a month after the announcement, RML hosted a public meeting
about the proposal. The following summer, concerned citizens opposed to the laboratory
expansion formed a new non-profit organization that collaborated with two previously
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established organizations'^. In Septem ber 2002, an environmental assessment was
released to the public by the NIAID, and the following month the first monthly meeting
for the RM L Community Liaison Group (CLG) was held. This group of 25 community
members was formed by RML to “promote collaboration and cooperation between RML
and the community” (RM L CLG meeting notes 2002). CLG members were charged with
communicating concerns from the community to RML and to NIAID, and to disseminate
information from the laboratory to the community.
RML hosted a town hall meeting and open house in early 2003 to disseminate
information about the laboratory expansion. After receiving public comments, the
NIAID announced that the environmental assessment was not adequate and therefore an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) had to be conducted. The EIS generated over 100
public comments from the community (Farrell 2003).
After public comments were submitted for the first EIS, a second EIS draft was
released in December 2003. Again citizens had another opportunity to voice concerns.
RM L hosted several public meetings and opposition groups also sponsored at least one
public meeting. In December 2003, a supplementary EIS was released. After a shorter
comment period, the NIH released the final EIS in April 2004. One opposition group
filed a lawsuit in which they claimed that the NIH had violated the Freedom of
Information Act by withholding requested internal documents; the opposition group won
the lawsuit and therefore the documents were released.
Despite community opposition efforts, the NIH officially approved the laboratory
IRF in June 2004. The agency had determined that the IRF expansion would provide the

^ T he nam es o f the three opposition groups involved with the IRF expansion arc not identified to insure
confidentiality o f these organizations and their mem bers.
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m ost benefit from public funding and noted that RM L is “historically strong in vector*
borne expertise, which is unmatched at any other site” (NIAID 2004c). Additionally, the
NIH concluded that the IRF expansion would have no negative effects or increased risks
to the environment, citizens, and community. The N IH ’s position supports its claim with
the fact that there has never been a community release of biological agents from any BSL
rV facility (Farrell 2003).
After the IRF was approved, opposition groups filed a joint lawsuit against the
NIH to stop the IRF construction. The judge denied the plaintiffs a trial and ordered
mediation, which resulted in a settlement agreement. Compromises from the mediation
included the agreements that RM L would submit a list of research pathogens to Ravalli
County doctors, that pathogens would not be used as biological weapons, and that all
safety related incidents would be reported to safety officers inside and outside of
laboratory (McKee 2004). Additionally, a backup isolation room outside the BSL IV at
RM L would be built 75 miles away to be used if an accident or pathogen release
occurred. Finally, the laboratory would discontinue incinerating non-medical waste by
the fall o f 2005 (McKee 2004).
Summary
The unique severity of spotted fever in the Bitterroot Valley is why RML was
established in the rural state of Montana. Since RM L began as a research facility for
spotted fever, it has become a highly technological facility equipped to study deadly
infectious diseases (see Table 3). Additionally, the organization and safety features at
RM L have continually changed. The expanded organization at RML, including an
increased numbers of employees, buildings, and research foci, has created a large, formal
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bureaucracy. Furthermore, it is a bureaucracy primarily managed by non-local federal
employees. In addition, the institution is now charged with the new responsibility of
managing bioterrorism research. Thus, the IRF expansion will become another layer of
RM L’s bureaucracy.
Table 3: RM L historical events (Source: compiled from newspaper articles, books,
and personal communication)___________________________________________________
Date(s) Event(s)________________________________________________________________
1880s Spotted fever emerges as a widespread problem in the Bitterroot Valley
1902
Spotted fever research begins in the Bitterroot Valley
1921
Old schoolhouse near Hamilton established as a spotted fever research facility
1925
Spotted fever vaccine created; 16 staff employed at the research facility
1927
Construction of a new laboratory facility in Hamilton
1932
Federal government purchases laboratory from the state of Montana; laboratory
apart of the Public Health Service
1934
New laboratory building constructed; laboratory officially named Rocky
Mountain Laboratory
1937
RML becomes apart of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
1938
3'^'* building and 2 houses constructed
1940
4'"' building constructed; 116 employees at RML
1955
NIH creates a new branch, the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) that subsequently includes RML
1970s RM L facility upgrades and 3 new research departments created
1983
RM L closure threat by the Grace Commission
1983- Rocky Mountain Lxiboratory name changed to Rocky Mountain Laboratories',
1989
biosafety laboratories codified
1990s BSL III laboratories installed
2001
Security increased and RML closed to the public; 255 employees at RML
2002
Integrated Research Facility (IRF) proposed
2004
IRF approved___________________________________________________________

Improved safety measures at RM L have created a research facility that is
currently more dependent on technology; however, it has become safer for infectious
disease research (Dr. Huber, pers. comm.; Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.; and Dr. Morgan,
pers.comm.). For example, deadly accidents have not occurred since the era of spotted
fever research during the early 1900s. The recent safety measure to restrict public access
has reduced the potential risks of outsider intervention at RML. However, restricted
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public access has also decreased its transparency, so that safety measures within RML
remain unknown to the public.
RM L has presented several problems for Hamilton, including its initial
construction, potential closures, and accidents. Community-wide opposition to plans at
RML has occurred twice, including opposition to the initial construction of the facility.
More recently, the IRF expansion project has sparked a grassroots opposition and such
rural opposition to biolaboratories has not yet been studied. The next chapter will review
the literature to provide a background of key factors influencing community opposition to
high risk hazardous facilities.
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CHAPTER TH REE- LITERATURE REVIEW

Community response to the siting of high risk hazardous facilities, including
nuclear power plants, nuclear incinerators, toxic waste landfills, and mining operations
have been widely examined in the sociological literature. Studies most frequently
examine community response to hazardous waste landfills because a high level of public
dread is associated with such facilities. Also, most studies of high risk hazardous
facilities in rural communities have focused on hazardous waste because of the high
proportion o f proposed sitings or successful sitings of hazardous waste facilities in rural
areas. These facilities have been sited, or proposed for siting, primarily in rural areas
where population density is low and large expanses of open land are available at
relatively low prices. Additionally, rural communities that encourage local growth
promotion as a solution to economic decline are frequent candidates for a hazardous
waste facility siting (Bohon and Humphrey 2000). Consequently, rural areas have
increasingly become a repository for the undesirable waste industries created by society
(Fitchen 1991).
The findings from high risk hazardous waste studies have been used to inform
other high risk technological projects, including gold cyanide mining (Richards and Brod
2004) and limestone mining (Eser and Luloff 2003; Steeman and Carmin 1998).
Although mining projects may not be as dreaded as hazardous waste, they are still
perceived to be high risk endeavors.
High risk hazardous facilities have been defined as projects that rely on
technology and involve uncertain risks. Frequently, new technology is used in high risk
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hazardous facilities to contain waste, extract minerals, and create energy. Uncertain risks
associated with high risk hazardous facilities include potential technological failures
which could threaten public health and the environment. Thus, high risk hazardous
facilities evoke dread. Community support and opposition to high risk hazardous
facilities have been analyzed by examining the perceptions of individuals. Resident
perceptions in high risk hazardous facility operating and siting communities have been
compared to resident attitudes in baseline, non-high risk hazardous facility locales.
Biolaboratories may be perceived by community residents as another type of a
high risk hazardous facility. Biological agents found in biolaboratories, particularly those
that may be used for bioterrorism and are untreatable, are most likely to be perceived as
dreadful as hazardous waste. Like high risk hazardous facilities, biolaboratories rely on
new technology to contain infectious diseases and involve uncertain risks if the agents
were to be released. However, biolaboratories as another perceived type of a high risk
hazardous facility have not yet been investigated.
Costs and Benefits of High Risk Hazardous Facilities
Residents facing the proposed siting of a high risk hazardous facility in their
community have to evaluate the possible benefits and costs associated with these new
institutions. Frequently, residents’ beliefs that the potential costs outweigh the benefits
spark community opposition. Thus, many siting attempts have failed because of strong
local resistance. Community opposition to “locally unwanted land uses” or LULUs is
frequently labeled as the “not in my backyard” or NIMBY syndrome. The NIMBY
syndrome suggests that while community members acknowledge the need for high risk
hazardous facilities, they do not want such institutions located near their particular
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com m unity (Fitchen 1991; Portney 1991). However, the NIMBY label does not
differentiate the various types o f opponents because some people may oppose the siting
o f these facilities in anyone’s backyard and not just their own (Luloff, Albrecht, and
Bourke 1998). Although the NIM BY label is frequently used to describe opposition to
LULUs, other complex and interconnected factors may determine residents’ attitudes.
Opposition to siting high risk hazardous facilities has been a major topic of rural
sociological research in the last 20 years (Benford, Moore and W illiams 1993; Bohon and
Humphrey 2000; Erickson 1994; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Hamilton 1985;
Krannich and Albrecht 1995; Sjoberg 2004; Slovic et al. 1991; Spies et al. 1998). The
key factors that increase community opposition to a high risk hazardous facility have
been identified as distrust of facility management, high risk perception, perceived lack of
economic benefits, potential stigma, previous negative siting experience, and perceived
inequalities. These factors are frequently interrelated so that opposition is
multidimensional and complex. Therefore, community opposition to the siting of high
risk hazardous facilities, including biolaboratories, is expected to be influenced by any
one or more of these factors.
Distrust
A key factor influencing opposition to the siting of a high risk hazardous facility
is distrust in the responsible agencies and organizations managing the sites (Albrecht,
Amey and Am ir 1996; Couch and Kroll-Smith 1994; Flynn et al. 1992; Jenkins-Smith
and Kunreuther 2001; Sjoberg 2004; W akefield and Elliot 2000). Opposition is
magnified when community members do not trust the people or institutions responsible
for the proposed facility. As trust in facility management decreases, resident opposition
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to these facilities increases (Albrecht et al. 1996; Couch and Kroll-Smith 1994; Flynn et
al. 1992; Jenkins-Sm ith and Kunreuther 2001; Sjoberg 2004; W akefield and Elliot 2000).
A related explanation for opposition to high risk hazardous facilities is recreancy,
a multidimensional factor of both trust and risk perception (Freudenberg 2001).
Freudenberg (2001: 87) originally defined recreancy as “the failure o f institutional actors
to carry out their responsibilities with the degree o f rigor necessary to merit the social
trust they enjoy.” Recreancy has been generally viewed as the extent to which people
trust institutions and experts responsible for safely managing high risk hazardous
facilities (Murdock et a. 1999).
When people lack the knowledge required to assess the risks and benefits
associated with a technology, they have to depend on experts to provide that information.
Thus, when individuals lack knowledge of a hazard or technology, trust in those
managing the facilities influences risk perception. Social trust in experts has been found
to be an important factor influencing risk perception when knowledge is lacking (Siegrist
and Cvetknivich 2000). As a result, residents with low levels of recreancy in nuclear
waste managements exhibit more opposition to those facilities (Freudenberg 2001).
Similarly, residents with lower levels of recreancy have shown higher levels of
opposition to high risk hazardous waste facilities (Murdoch et al.l999).
Risk Perception
Opposed community members may question the ability of a facility’s
management to protect the community from various perceived health and safety hazards
associated with the facilities during the construction and operation of these sites. Such
opposition to a high risk hazardous facility has been found to be influenced by the
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perceptions of technological risk (Flynn et al. 1992). Perceived technological risk is thus
associated with the potential negative consequences that may result from the technologies
used to operate facilities. W hen a technology is risky, people anticipate few benefits
from its implementation (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000). Risk perception studies have
found that people perceive hazardous wastes, especially nuclear waste, as unknown,
uncontrollable, and dreadful (Slovic 1987). Additionally, another dimension of risk
perception is the idea of “tampering with nature”, or interfering with natural processes
(Sjoberg 2000). As community m em bers’ risk perception in a proposed facility
increases, the likelihood that they will oppose the facility also increases (Bourke 1994;
Flynn et al. 1992; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Krannich and Albrecht 1995;
Spies et al. 1998).
Risk perception is closely associated with potential public health, safety risks, and
environmental contamination. Community opposition results when residents fear that the
community’s health and safety are threatened if a facility’s technology fails (Bassett,
Jenkins-Smith and Silva 1996). General environmental contamination and specific
environmental impacts on wildlife, groundwater, rivers, and other water sources have
also been found to be major technological risk concerns of those opposed to siting
facilities (Albrecht el al. 1996; Baxter, Eyles and Elliott 1999; Krannich & Albrecht
1995). Additionally, residents may fear that environmental contamination could cause an
area to become an unsuitable location for people to live (Bassett el al, 1996). Resistance
is magnified when opposed residents perceive high levels of risk associated with both
health and safety issues and environmental contamination (Murdoch et al. 1999).
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Numerous studies have tried to explain why people perceive risk differently. One
explanation is that risk perception is impacted by the knowledge level that each
individual has of the technological application at any given high risk hazardous facility;
however, there are disagreements as to whether less knowledge actually increases risk
perception. Some studies have found that those with greater knowledge of the
technology utilized in or proposed for facilities perceive less risk (Bassett el al. 1996),
while other studies have noted that those with less knowledge perceive more risk (Flynn
et al. 1992). Still studies have found that less knowledge does not equate to more
opposition; in fact, those most strongly opposed to a high risk hazardous waste facility
have the greatest level of knowledge of waste management issues (Murdock et al. 1999).
Perception of risk appears to be socially constructed differently by experts and
laypeople who “speak in different languages” (Gerrard 1994). Experts and laypeople
appear to have different “conceptual frameworks” when defining and evaluating risks
(Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz 1993). Experts can be defined as those people with
professional involvement with risk assessment who perceive risks based on quantitative,
technical, and factual information (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1985). Experts are
more positive about high risk hazardous technologies and have fewer concerns (Flynn et
al. 1993); additionally, they believe little is unknown about technological risk (Sjoberg
2001). In contrast, laypeople can be considered those people who assess risks that are
more likely to be unanswered by science, especially those risks that are unfamiliar,
dreaded, unobservable, or have delayed effects (Fischhoff et al. 1985). Laypeople are
skeptical about expert knowledge and view unknown risk as very negative (Sjoberg
2001 ).
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W hile experts evaluate risks based on scientific information, laypersons perceive
risks as questions that science has not answered. This discrepancy in identifying risk
often fuels com m unity opposition to a high risk hazardous facility. Residents may view
experts as not only untrustworthy but also as patronizing and too technical (Baxter et al.
1999). Expert communication at public meetings may negatively impact residents’
perceptions o f risk (M cComas 2003). Residents may also believe there are limits to the
experts’ knowledge so that guarantees of negligible risks can not be legitimately made by
the experts (Baxter et al. 1999). Although most evidence suggests that experts judge risk
differently than laypeople, others conclude that little empirical evidence exists to support
this claim since risk perception is confounded by other social and demographic factors
(Row and W right 2001).
Lack of Perceived Economic Benefits
A key factor influencing opposition to the siting of high risk hazardous facilities
is the perception that the facility will not provide economic benefits to individuals and the
community. As many rural communities struggle economically, high risk hazardous
facilities offer a source of potential economic growth that could create local employment.
Additionally, economic incentives and mitigations offered by the facility’s management
could increase public funds for infrastructure and services such as roads, schools, water
or sewer systems, and police and fire protection. Overall, opponents to a facility have
negative views of the benefits offered by facility management (Jenkins-Smith and
Kunreuther 2001).
Opposition to a facility is increased if residents perceive that few economic
benefits will result from the new facilities (Bourke 1994; Krannich and Albrecht 1995;
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M urdock et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998). Additionally, communities with a stronger local
economy perceive fewer economic benefits and have been found to exhibit more
opposition than those with weaker local economies (Bourke 1994). Greater levels of
opposition have also been documented in towns further away from proposed facilities
since residents perceive fewer economic benefits as facility distance increases (Benford
et al. 1993).
Stigma
Community stigma may also become associated with siting a high risk hazardous
facility and such stigma has been found to impact resident opposition. Stigma can affect
the “collective morale” or social well-being of a community (Gregory and Satterfield
2002; W ulfhorst 2000; W ulfhorst and Krannich 1999). Additionally, stigma can cause
many psychological and cultural impacts for contaminated community members
(Gregory and Satterfield 2002).
Residents may be concerned that hosting a high risk hazardous facility will result
in the community being labeled as “contaminated” and that permanent stigmatization will
result (Wulfhorst 2000). Because outsiders may perceive the community as
contaminated, the com m unity’s reputation will be destroyed. Stigma can therefore have
negative economic effects on a locale. Opposed residents believe that stigma will have a
negative impact on industries located in the community; in particular, concern for a
decline in tourism has been noted (Albrecht et al. 1996; Flynn et. al 1992; Slovic et. al
1991).
Additionally, opposed residents may believe that a high risk hazardous facility
will threaten the quality of life of their rural community and that the core community
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values of a quiet, small-town community will be lost (Baxter et. al 1999; Couch and
Kroll-Smith 1994; Fitchen 1991; Krannich and Albrecht 1995; W akefield and Elliott
2000). In particular, opposed residents may believe that their community will be spoiled
by such a facility and that the impacts are not consistent with rural images of an open,
clean countryside (Baxter et al. 1999; Fitchen 1991). While stigma is most frequently
associated with negative consequences, residents of high growth communities may
believe stigma will suppress population growth, which may be a positive outcome for
those resistant to population growth (Wulfhorst 2000).
Siting Experience
Opposition is also influenced by whether a community currently hosts a high risk
hazardous facility. W hen a high risk hazardous facility is a new institution in a
community, the new host residents’ opinions differ from residents in communities
already hosting such facilities. Residents are more likely to be opposed to the siting o f a
new facility if their community is not a current host. Communities with high risk
industries are already fam iliar with the facilities and technology; additionally, local
community members may work at the facility. In contrast, in potential host communities
such facilities may be a new, unknown threat (Albrecht et. al 1996; Krannich and
Albrecht 1995; Sjoberg 2004).
Community opposition is also influenced by the siting process as residents
balance the costs and benefits associated with their community hosting a high risk
hazardous facility. Residents in baseline, nonwaste facility communities are more likely
to be opposed than residents of waste operating and waste siting communities (Murdock
et al. 1999). Although opposition may still be high, residents of communities with an
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operating or soon to be sited facility become less opposed overall to high risk hazardous
facilities when compared to baseline, nonwaste facility communities; additionally,
residents perceive lower risk levels created by these facilities (Benford et al. 1993;
M urdock et al. 1999).
Equity
Perception of equity in distributing the potential impacts of a high risk hazardous
facility is a key factor influencing resident opposition to such facilities. Equity issues
often involve questions of intrusion since unwanted wastes and technologies are imported
into communities. Public opposition is greater when the hazards are created elsewhere
and imported into a community (Gerrard 1994).
W hile society has created the need for these facilities, rural residents are required
to take more hazardous waste than urban residents as communities that host high risk
hazardous waste facilities are predominantly rural (Murdock et al. 1999). Rural residents
become sensitive to the costs and benefits that their community will face by hosting these
sites. Frequently, site managers offer economic incentives and safety measures to the
community to mitigate the costs and risks associated with hosting high risk hazardous
facilities. If the economic benefits and safety measures offered by facility management
are perceived as unfair, opposition is increased (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001).
Opposed community members may feel that the process offers little opportunity for
meaningful participation (Wakefield and Elliott 2000). Additionally, if the siting process
is perceived as unfair, opposition is often magnified (Murdoch et al. 1999; Spies et al.
1998).
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The environmental justice movement has focused attention on the fact that ethnic,
people o f color, and poor communities are disproportionately exposed to environmental
risks (Bullard 1993). As the number o f colored people increases in a community, the
probability o f high risk hazardous facilities being located there increases (Lee 1993).
Socio-economic status also impacts the location of hazardous wastes, as poor
comm unities are more likely to be targeted as hosts (Lee 1993). Residents in
comm unities with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to oppose a high risk
hazardous facility, despite the potential economic opportunity (Buhon and Humphrey
2000). However, race is still the most significant predictor of where hazardous waste
facilities are located (Lee 1993). Frequently a combination of equity factors influences
community opposition; for example, opposed residents may feel that their community is
being targeted because it is a poor, rural, ethnic community (Albrecht et. al 1996).
Summary
The complex and interrelated key factors influencing opposition to high risk
hazardous facilities in rural communities have been widely examined. Opposition to the
siting o f other high risk hazardous facilities, including biolaboratories, should be
expected to be influenced by similar factors. However, community response to
biolaboratories has not yet been investigated. Therefore, the previous studies examining
community opposition to high risk hazardous facilities will inform this study. This
exploratory study will examine if opposition to a biolaboratory reflects those of other
high risk hazardous facilities.
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CHAPTER FOUR- M ETHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to explore the degree to which a biolaboratory is
perceived to be a high risk hazardous facility. Additionally, this study will explore
community opposition to the IRF expansion at RM L in Hamilton, Montana. This study
will seek to describe the perspectives of those opposed to the project during the period of
proposed expansion from January 2002 through June 2004. Therefore, in the context of
what is known about community opposition to high risk hazardous facilities, this study
will seek to answer the following question: W hat are the factors that characterize
community opposition to the ERF expansion at RML?
Research studies on rural, community grassroots opposition to biolaboratories is
an unexplored topic. Since this topic has not been studied, I will use qualitative
methodology for this exploratory study. Historical analysis and in-depth interviews were
the two types of qualitative methodology used in this study. Qualitative methodology is
useful when seeking to “uncover and understand what lies behind any phenomenon about
which little is yet known” (Strauss and Corbin 1990:19).
Historical Research
A detailed historiography o f RML was created through historical research
methods. Historical research is “a process that examines events or combination of events
in order to uncover accounts of what happened in the past” (Berg 2004:234).
Understanding the history of events, people, and institutions is an important element of
understanding recent or present situations (Berg 2004).
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The historiography of RM L was compiled by collecting primary and secondary
data. Primary data were collected from personal communication with one current, and
two previous, RM L scientists. I m et with each current or previous RML scientist at
his/her home, office, or RML. I m et with each person once, and our conversations lasted
approximately one to two hours. During these personal communications, I asked each
scientist to describe the laboratory’s history including changes in organizational structure,
safety features, and research agenda. These conversations were not audio tape recorded,
but I took detailed notes. W ithin one day after the conversations, I typed my notes from
the conversations so key information would not be forgotten. I also collected secondary
data from newspaper articles, magazine articles, books, U.S. Census Bureau documents,
and RML documents.
In-Depth Interviews
Sampling
The target population of this study is defined as those residents of Hamilton,
Montana and the surrounding area who were opposed to the IRF expansion during the
study period. Residents opposed to the biolaboratory expansion include individuals who
served as staff or active members of opposition groups, maintained a leadership role in
the opposition movement, or participated in voicing concerns, writing letters, or some
other form of active criticism of the expansion.
Purposive and snowball sampling were used to select participants for in-depth
interviews. Purposive sampling was used first to identify three participants who were key
leaders of opposition groups on the basis of newspaper coverage. After using purposive
sampling to identify the first three opponents, snowball sampling was used to identify
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other potential participants for the in-depth interviews. Snowball sampling was used to
“locate subjects with certain attributes or characteristics” (Berg 2004:36). In this study, I
used snowball sampling to identify opposed citizens to the IRF expansion at RML. This
was accomplished by asking participants at the close of each interview to suggest other
community activists who may have also been opposed to the expansion.
Interviews were conducted until saturation, or the lack of new information
produced in the interviews, was achieved. Additionally, as I requested names of
prospective interviewees from participants, their suggestions began to overlap. Overall, I
found a general willingness by those opposed to the IRF expansion to participate in this
study. Twelve potential participants were contacted for this study; however, one person
did not respond and another individual agreed to participate but did not return telephone
calls to arrange an interview. Thus, a total of 10 interviews were conducted in August,
September, and November 2005.
In the sample, six individuals were male and four were female. Five of the
participants lived in Hamilton, Montana, and five lived outside of the Hamilton city
limits. A total of seven interview participants were members of opposition groups; three
individuals did not identify themselves as part of any particular group.
The Interview Process
Interviews were conducted to gain an in-depth description of opposed residents’
perspectives. I contacted prospective participants on the telephone. After providing a
short description of the project, I asked potential participants if they considered
themselves to be opposed to the expansion. If residents identified themselves as opposed
to the expansion and agreed to participate in the study, a meeting location and time were
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airanged. All interviews were conducted face-to-face at either the Hamilton Public
Library or the participants’ place of employment or residence. I guaranteed the
participants confidentiality and the interviews were audio tape-recorded.
The in-depth interviews were semi-structured, which provided flexibility in the
ordering and wording o f questions (Berg 2004). Additionally, I found this strategy
provided flexibility so that probing questions could be asked to clarify participants’
responses and to elicit more information (Berg 2004). An interview guide (see Appendix
C) was created to provide a general outline for the purposive conversations, although
because o f my semi-structured approach, it was not strictly followed. During the
interviews, I asked questions about the participant’s concerns with the IRF expansion and
how he/she expressed those concerns. I also asked participants to describe their opinion
of the IRF expansion, previous opinion of RML, and how they thought that the approval
process had affected their community. The interviews ranged from approximately 30
minutes to 90 minutes in length.
Data Analysis
Data management was the first step in the data analysis process. Before
transcription, a pseudonym was given to each participant. 1 transcribed each audio tape
recorded interview verbatim within one week following each interview into Microsoft
W ord. After transcription, I imported the transcription text into the qualitative software
program NVIVO which I found to be a helpful data management tool. I used the NVIVO
program to organize, store, and search the data obtained from each in-depth interviews.
The second step of the data analysis process was accomplished by using content
analysis. This interpretative approach views written documents, such as interview
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transcripts, as “text” that can be condensed, categorized, and compared (Berg 2004). I
began content analysis by open coding to “open inquiry widely” (Berg 2004:278). Open
coding is the “naming and categorizing of phenomena through close examination of data”
(Strauss and Corbin 1990:62). During this process, I examined five interviews line by
line and asked: what does this text represent? What is the major idea of this line of data?
For example, one participant said “People are so ignorant though, they just don’t want to
believe that the government would do something that way or be anything but
forthcoming.” During open coding, I labeled this sentence in NVIVO as skeptical o f the
government. Although NVIVO does not analyze data, I used it to create and apply
themes to the data. After themes were created and labeled to corresponding data, I used
NVrVO to search and explore the coded data. For example, I could use NVIVO to locate
each sentence labeled as skeptical o f the government.
In open coding, I used an inductive approach, which is the process of immersing
oneself in the data “in order to identify the dimensions or themes” (Berg 2004:272). By
using this approach, I was able to create my own themes to describe the data. In using
the open coding strategy to analyze five interview transcripts, 1 created approximately 25
codes. After analyzing five interviews, the open codes began to overlap. For example, I
had created the theme skeptical o f the government and fe a r government was hiding
information. As a result of the open coding strategy, themes were not well defined and it
became difficult to label the data.
The second step of content analysis was axial coding, which is defined as “a set of
procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making
connections between categories” (Stauss and Corbin 1990:96).

During axial coding, I

V
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incorporated the deductive approach, whereby categories suggested by the literature
review were integrated into the content analysis process. This strategy o f balancing
inductive and deductive approaches allowed the creation of categories from the data
guided by insights from previous studies.
Thus, I examined the codes produced during open coding and compared those to
themes suggested by the literature review. For example, the previously mentioned code
skeptical o f the government was comparable to the theme from the research literature of
distrust. Furthermore, during axial coding I noted various dimensions of distrust were
prevalent in the data, including distrust o f the federal government and distrust o f
laboratory scientists. I found these dimensions by asking: How are these data similar
and/or different? Therefore, I was able to define each theme and subsequently code the
data with these themes. I thus analyzed each of the 10 interview transcripts and labeled
the data with themes created during axial coding.
Results of the coding analysis process were then compiled based on the
prevalence of the themes that I identified in the interview data. I used NVIVO to search
the coded interviews to compile a list of data for each theme. For example, I could
search for distrust and NVIVO compiled all the data labeled with this theme. I then
found the prevalence of each theme by counting the number of participants who
mentioned them. For example, I counted how many out of the 10 interviews included
data labeled with the theme distrust. Themes were then prioritized from most to least
prevalent. The results from the content analysis of the interview data, including themes
organized from most to least prevalent, are presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE- RESULTS

Several themes characterized participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at
RM L (see Table 4). The prevalence with which participants mentioned any particular
theme varied. Nevertheless, themes could be organized from most to least frequently
prevalent in terms o f how many participants mentioned a given theme during the in-depth
interviews. Prevalence was determined by the num ber of participants who mentioned
any particular theme during each in-depth interview. This chapter summarizes those
themes that emerged in terms of the prevalence with which participants expressed them.
Table 4: Prevalence o f the themes found to characterize participants* opposition_____
Theme
Number of participants who mentioned theme
Negative perception o f the IRF
expansion approval process
10
Distrust in institutional authority
9
Negative perception o f potential IRF
risks
8
Distrust in the justification for
bioterrorism research
7
Negative perception of the equity of
7
IRF expansion
Perceived lack of economic benefits
3
from IRF expansion
Negative Perception o f the IRF Expansion Approval Process
The most prevalent theme found to strongly characterize participants’ descriptions
of opposition was a negative perception of the public process involved in approving the
IRF expansion. Participants reported being disappointed, discouraged, and outraged by
the IRF approval process. One opponent described the approval process as “heinous” ;
another as a “slap in the face”; and a third as “really crappy”. Every participant
interviewed expressed concern about the IRF approval process. Thus, a negative

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
perception o f the approval process appeared to most strongly characterize each of the 10
participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML.
Four dimensions of perception of the IRF approval process characterized
participants’ description of opposition. These dimensions included a perception of a
predetermined outcome, concern with unaddressed safety issues, an experience with
unanswered questions, and a sense of feeling powerless.
Perception o f a Predetermined Outcome
One dimension of the negative perception of the approval process that influenced
participants’ opposition was their perception that the IRF approval process outcome was
predetermined. All of the participants claimed that the outcome of the ERF approval
process had already been decided. Participants expressed discouragement in describing
how they felt that the NIH was determined to locate the BSL IV laboratory at RML and
that the federal government was just “going through the process”. They claimed that the
NIH thought that it could “slip the BSL IV laboratory through” without anyone noticing.
Mr. Adams‘S describes how the decision was “pre-ordained”:
I went through the process of the local stuff and it was obvious from the meetings
and talking to people here that it [IRF approval process] was pre-ordained. The
government and the lab had already made the decision they were going to build it
[BSL rv laboratory] here no matter what the locals said, no matter what the state
said. It is obvious from the meetings and from these people that it is going to go
through no m atter what.

^ A ll participants were previously assigned pseudonym s to insure their anonym ity, so quotations around
long, direct quotes are not included. A dditionally, their organizational af filiation and other key
characteristics that could identify the participants have been dropped or m odified to insure their
confidentiality.
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Similarly, Ms. Peterson claimed that the outcome had been predetermined:
There was a ton of examples that we pulled together. Just the way they [RML
and NIH]^ were talking about it was like this is what we are going to do. They
came and presented it [IRF expansion] that early meeting as we are building this
here. It w asn’t we are proposing, but we are building this here.
Thus, participants described how they believed that the outcome of the public
process to approve the IRF expansion as predetermined and expressed how it had
impacted their opposition. As Ms. Peterson noted, “That [the public process] was
something that made a lot o f people angry. How valid is the process if you already made
this decision?”
Concern with Unaddressed Safety Issues
Another dimension that opponents’ expressed in their dissatisfaction with the IRF
approval process was that the safety issues that they were concerned about had not been
addressed. Every participant noted at least one, if not many, safety issues with the BSL
IV laboratory. Mr. Green questioned, “The main concern for me was safety. . . Were
they [RML] going to be safe”?
Participants expressed concerns about a wide variety of safety issues. For
example, five participants questioned whether the security at RML was adequate,
especially in preventing a terrorist intrusion to obtain biological agents or in avoiding a
possible terrorist attack on RML. Mr. Potter noted, “This has got to be one of the softest
targets anywhere”, and noted the laboratory’s vulnerability to “either whackos or
terrorists”. Ms. Moore also was concerned with a perceived lack o f RML security:
The terrorist thing [September 11, 2001] recently happened and there is just like
this little chain linked fence around there [RML]. It is ju st-th ere is no safety.
® D uring the interview s, participants often used the term “they” when referring to those overseeing the IRF
exp an sion . It is unclear w hether participants were referring to RM L, N IH , or both. Thus, because o f this
am biguity, I have noted both R M L and NIH .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48
And then I said how hard would it be to go blow that place up? Or like do
anything to it. You could totally breach that system. It’s not— I mean I could—
and I’m Joe public and I don’t know anything about any of that but it would not
be hard. No, they [RM L and NIH] didn’t talk about it.
Five participants expressed concern that the laboratory’s emergency plan in the
event of an accident or release o f a BSL TV agent would fail. Ms. Peterson explained:
W hat we wanted was basically proof that or a good argument from the lab they
could handle emergencies associated with the BL four. This was part of the
public process and part of the EIS, but it was like okay we can’t really decide if
we are for or against this thing. W e just want to know if you are prepared for it.
If it turns out you are inadequately prepared for it, then we are probably against it.
If you can prove that, yes, we have thought about all these contingencies. We
have the infrastructure in place. W e have a really good emergency plan that can
handle it. Then we can come out in favor of it. We still don’t have that
information.
Four participants also expressed concern that the community might lack adequate
infrastructure to handle an accident or release of a BSL IV agent. Mr. Potter noted:
Accidents do happen even in the best of situations, so I think a facility like that
[BSL r v laboratory] for that reason should not be built in a residential area. The
infrastructure in Hamilton is insufficient to handle some big outbreak.
Three participants, including Mr. Potter, expressed concern about the transport of
infected people to other locations in the event of an accident:
Instead of spending what it would have cost to bring the Marcus Daly hospital up
to specs to deal with a patient that might be infected with stuff coming out of that
lab, instead of doing it here in Hamilton where presumably the potentially bigger
danger lies, the plan is to ship them clear to Missoula. Because Missoula already
had a facility that was going to be cheaper to upgrade— well, hell with that money
we are talking people’s lives. And Highway 93 is famous for accidents. So here
you are going to have a person that maybe has Ebola in back of a regular
ambulance clear up to Missoula. W ell, there is a possibility to have Ebola spread
down the highway.
Similarly, two participants also expressed concern about the safety of transporting
pathogens to the laboratory. Mr. Hill explained:
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Even the transport of pathogens coming into this BL four. A lot of the people that
were citizen liaison members for the lab—picked by the lab—at the meetings had
no idea that these pathogens were transported through FedEx. The same trucks
that deliver your packages are delivering th o se .. .You know we have NIH
security at the lab that we never had before. It would be really nice to think that
they are the ones responsible for transport from airport to lab direct, instead of it
being handled throughout the whole valley in a FedEx truck.
Although expressions about safety issues varied widely, participants appeared
dissatisfied in how their safety concerns were being addressed by the public process
established to approve the IRF expansion. Each participant complained about the
inadequacies of the Environmental Assessment (EA) and the multiple drafts of the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Participants claimed that these procured
documents did not properly address the safety issues associated with the BSL IV
laboratory. Mr. Davis, as well as other participants, complained about the EIS that the
NIH had released:
In their environmental impact statements, they [RML and NIH] would look at
what are the safety impacts? What are the environmental impacts of this lab?
And essentially they were saying there are none. We provided them with 70
pages of impacts for them to look over and consider. When we get [other federal
government] EIS on large proposals, they usually run about 700 to 1000 pages.
W hat we got was about a 40 or 50 page little document that essentially said there
aren’t any impacts.
Mr. Davis noted that the EIS was “about a 40 or 50 page” document, and three
other participants also commented specifically about how they perceived the size of the
report to be exceptionally small. For example, Ms. Jackson complained that the
environmental assessment was “inadequate” and only “one eighth or quarter of an inch”:
They [RML and NIH] didn’t do an adequate environmental assessment to begin
with. They did a very shoddy job. We asked them to do another one, and then an
environmental impact statement and then 1 think they did— I even lost track— the
EA, the EIS, and all that but there were several, several times we asked them—
this is just not adequate. W hen we got the first one it was maybe one eighth or
quarter of an inch big. For something like the highway [93] project, they had
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mounds and mounds of paperwork on that for environmental impact statement.
So you would think something this big, and this is the government, this is
National Institute of Health, NIA ID that they would think ahead and do
something adequate to begin with. But they just didn’t. They just didn’t.
Five participants also expressed disappointment in how their concerns about
safety issues were overlooked by the RM L Community Liaison Group (CLG). They also
expressed disapproval in how RML had formed the CLG (see page 24 for the earlier
discussion o f the formation of the CLG). As Mr. Potter noted, “the people at Rocky
Mountain Lab had selected them [CLG] because of their support of the lab.’’ Participants
claimed that they did not think their concerns could be addressed by the CLG because it
was dominated by “cheerleaders” for the IRF expansion. In the words of one participant,
Mr. Green:
The citizen’s advisory group is appointed. So much for representation since
it is appointed. They invited, I think they invited [opposition group] on it
because they were the quote [type of environmental group]. First thing we said is
it doesn’t represent—where is [opposition group], why aren’t they at the table?
W hy aren’t they at the table? It wasn’t democratic. It was a stacked deck.
Five participants also expressed discouragement with how the CLG meetings
functioned. They claimed that participants felt the meetings offered few opportunities for
public participation. For example, Mr. Hill described the CLG:
It [community liaison meeting] was run from the lab. It was done in the lab and
so as a spectator if you wanted to get in you would have to call prior. You would
be able to sit behind [community liaison members] but you could not ask any
questions or participate in any way. Only the citizens of the liaison could bring in
questions from the community.
In sum, participants explained how the CLG meetings, which had been designed
to increase communication between RML and the community, did not address their
safety concerns. Ms. Brooks commented that the CLG meetings “were a joke. Anybody
who was on that would tell you it was a jo k e.”
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Experiences with Unanswered Questions
Frequently, participants noted how their safety concerns were unaddressed by the
IRF approval process because o f unanswered questions. Six participants expressed
discouragement in how many of their questions were unanswered by the approval
process. For example, Ms. Moore said she had questioned what would happen in the
event of an emergency, and she noted that “they [RML and NIH] didn’t have an answer.
They had no idea.”
Participants described how their questions frequently went unanswered, and they
described how the lack of information angered them. Mr. Smith noted that the lack of
information “set people o f f ’:
I knew that at the first meeting getting any information out of them [RML and
NIH], it was obvious that they weren’t giving any information. That was really
what set people off. Right at the beginning.
Later in the interview, Mr. Smith continued:
Then they [RML] held a meeting, that is, a public meeting was organized by the
Rocky Mountain Lab and people attended and most of them had only known
about it for three or four days at the tim e .. . we were bothered by the fact that
they didn’t know anything. We were bothered even more after the meeting
because we were asking questions and we were told we are not here to answer
questions, we are here to take comments. That was the formula that they were
using. They had no information to give out about it [IRF expansion] except for
some pictures that they had some renderings. Nothing much about the impacts.
Nothing much about how in would affect the community or anything else.
Participants explained how in the course of the IRF approval process safety issues
and questions remained unanswered. Thus, as their concerns were trivialized, their anger
increased. For example, Ms. Brooks noted:
Actually my really main concern was the process. 1 felt, and I spoke at a couple
o f meetings, I felt it was a done deal. That they [RML and NIH] really-the
whole process that they went through was really for show. I don’t feel like it ever
had—they were just going through the motions. To add insult to injury, at the end
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of two or three meetings they would serve us cookies.. . [Lab personnel] would
say, ‘Well we need to stop now so we can have coffee and cookies,’ And it was
like give me a break. I really felt that they were very condescending. That they
really were just going through the motions. I have to say as the process went on I
probably got a little angrier. Especially when they kept feeding us cookies.
Sense o f Feeling Powerlessness
Seven participants described a sense of feeling powerless as the IRF approval
process unfolded. Four participants specifically referred to the IRF approval process as a
“gam e”, and two participants noted that the process was like “banging your head against
the wall”.
Participants described feeling powerless because they said that the approval
process was predetermined, ignored their safety concerns, and left their questions
unaddressed. They claimed that the opinions of local residents, including themselves,
were ignored. Mr. Hill said, “They were ramming this down our throat. They were
giving us no options in the matter; it wasn’t brought to the people to begin with.”
Similarly, Ms. Moore noted:
No, I mean it was hideous. They [RML and NIH] didn’t listen. They didn’t care
what any of the locals said. I mean they tried to sidestep so much of the issue and
wouldn’t answer questions. It Just wasn’t a two-way dialogue at all. It really
never w a s.. . And yet they are not willing to meet us at the table as a community
member. I live [in Hamilton], this is my concern—what can we do? They
wouldn’t even talk about it. It is crazy. It was really discouraging, like beating
your head against a wall. . . They were like it doesn’t matter what you people
think. We are doing this. W e are the U.S. government.
Ms. Jackson described how her sense of powerlessness contributed to her opposition and
involvement:
I became, for a lack of better words, obsessed. Because I was just seeing so much
deceit and I felt there was so much injustice. And I knew that people here felt
like they didn’t have a voice. . . I think 1 was feeling a little powerless, and that is
why I started to get involved. As we were going to more meetings at the lab, we
felt like they were playing a game. I felt like they were playing a game.
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Distrust in Institutional Authority
In addition to a negative perception of the IRF expansion approval process at
RML, participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion was characterized by strong distrust
in institutional authority. Three dimensions of distrust in institutional authority
characterized participants’ expression of opposition to the IRF expansion. One
dimension was distrust in the “experts”, or laboratory scientists at RML. The second
dimension was distrust in the federal government in managing RML. Finally,
participants expressed distrust in information about RML as sources of reliable
information were often rumors and stories.
D istrust o f Laboratory Scientists
Participants expressed skepticism of the “expert” scientists at RML. Nine of the
10 participants expressed distrust in the scientists at RML and said that their distrust had
contributed to their opposition to the IRF expansion. One participant, Ms. Moore,
described her perception of RML scientists when she said, “We are these wonderful
scientists. How could we go wrong? Shame on you for not trusting us. I was just like
whoa.”
Some participants claimed that experts from RML and NIH used their position
and scientific knowledge to persuade residents to support the IRF expansion. One
participant, Ms. Brooks, called the experts “big-wigs” and said they “could talk circles
around the average Bitterrooter.” Part of the distrust in laboratory scientists arose as
participants claimed that the IRF approval process had become controlled by experts.
Mr. Smith explained:
It [IRF approval process] became run by a professional back in Bethesda. They
used every little nuance like everybody’s a doctor; doctor this, doctor that makes
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these pronouncements. They are supposed to be scientific and everything I knew
very well that they w eren’t.
Participants expressed distrust in laboratory scientists in noting that they are “just
human” and “humans make mistakes all the time.” Mr. Potter noted that the scientists
were “very fallible.” M ost participants said that they questioned the experts’ knowledge
and noted that human mistakes were inevitable in the laboratory, even by expert
scientists. The inevitability of mistakes at RML was described by Mr. Potter:
I know that people make blunders everyday at their jobs and there is not a fool
proof system. If people are lackadaisical there will be mistakes made. It is
just inevitable.
In contrast to most participants accepting the inevitability of human error at RML,
some reported that the laboratory scientists had made contradicting declarations. These
participants described how the experts claimed that mistakes at RML would not happen.
According to them, the experts claimed mistakes in the “super high-tech” laboratory were
impossible. Ms. Peterson explained:
There w asn’t terribly good documentation, and they [RML and NIH] didn’t
provide very much, of any one ever making a mistake at the lab before. And of
course no one has ever made a mistake at a level four and they had all these
inaccurate assumptions.
The expert role was challenged as mistakes that occurred at RML were revealed.
Participants noted how during the IRF approval process, several historical mistakes that
had occurred at RML, or errors for which RML was responsible, had become public. For
example, participants described the deaths of research monkeys from a thermostat
malfunction, an unidentified object found on RML property, and RML waste disposal
buried at a nearby landfill. Often, participants described these events in the context of the
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probability of future mistakes happening at RML. For example, Ms. Jackson described
how opponents had discovered such events and revealed the “truth” to the public;
I was trying to get a lot of the truth out, and there were a lot of things we
discovered that were made public. RM L was a superfund site. When they dug up
to start building for the level three, they discovered buried ash pits with old
debris in it. They found a pile or a hole with old vaccine vials buried from years
ago. We also discovered that RM L along with Corixa lab had contributed to the
Victor landfill, which was also a superfund. They were dumping their chemicals
th e re .. . So these things just started coming to the surface during our research.
Participants also expressed disapproval in how RML had handled such events.
Mr. Hill described in detail one event at the laboratory and how he distrusted the way the
problem had been handled:
There have been a lot of mistakes over at the lab people weren’t really privy to.
One of the things that had happened—basically in the newspapers and the way it
was reported—was they [RML] found an item that was out by the fence line. An
unidentified item and they had handled according to protocol and that the bomb
squad in M issoula was contacted.. . And in the newspaper it came out that is was
handled through protocol, basically that they [RML] did a good job. .. And not
only was it taken into the security shack, mishandled, shouldn’t have been
touched in the first place. . . But that is how the thing kind of came about, but yet
in the papers you read how they do everything by protocol and it’s done real nice
and everything else.
Several participants expressed concern about both the potential frequency of high
risk incidents and the subsequent potentially poor incident response at the BSL IV
laboratory. They expressed distrust in the ability of RML to prevent and respond to
future accidents or errors once it became a BSL IV laboratory. Ms. Jackson noted:
There were people that got sick that worked at the lab, tuberculosis for instance.
These people were part of the community. They were out there in the community.
So the potential for—if they are that careless with something as non-lethal as
tuberculosis—how careful or cautious would they be with things that are more
deadly?
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D istrust in the Federal Government
Distrust in the federal government, which manages RML, was a theme often
expressed by participants in describing their opposition to the IRF expansion. Seven of
the 10 participants expressed distrust in the federal government and its ability to manage
RM L. Frequently, when participants spoke of the federal government, they noted that a
person would have to be “naïve” or “crazy” to trust the government. This distrust was
contextualized in their description o f how the federal government is not honest and “does
bad things”. For example, Ms. Moore explained how she did not understand why people
would trust the government:
So, we just couldn’t believe it that they [federal government] were going to try to
do that [build a BSL IV laboratory]. But then at the same time we were already
aware o f what the U.S. government is up to, so it really didn’t surprise us once we
started thinking about i t . . . People are so ignorant though, they just don’t want to
believe that the government would do something that way or be anything but
forthcoming and on the up and up. Which is crazy that people still think that.
Participants described how their distrust in the federal government increased as
the approval process had progressed. Some noted a growing belief that the government
was ignoring laws and hiding information during the expansion approval process. For
example, Mr. Davis described how his organization had sued the NIH because it would
not provide internal documents that they were requesting under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). As a result, he felt the government was “hiding” things:
They [NIH] didn’t actually admit that they were wrong, but they furnished the
documents and gave us all o f our attorney’s fees. Which to me, and our
organization was a victory and it validated what we were saying and that they
were trying to hide things.
Two participants also expressed distrust in the federal government in describing
how irregularities in the RML water and sewer bill were discovered during the IRF
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approval process. One participant, Mr. Smith, described in detail how he discovered the
billing irregularities, in which by his calculations, RM L owed the city of Hamilton
approximately $1 million. Another participant, Mr. Adams, also noted the water and
sewer billing discrepancies and said:
Let me tell you something about the lab. This will tell you something about our
government. In all the years the lab has been there, they haven’t paid their sewer
and water bill completely. There is like hundreds of thousands of dollars that they
want us to write off. This is our government. If our government won’t pay their
water bill, how can we trust them to do anything right? Do you trust anybody that
w on’t pay their bills? No.
Distrust in Rumors and Stories
Another dimension of distrust expressed by participants was the lack of reliable
information about RML as a result of the number of rumors and stories about the
laboratory circulating within Hamilton and surrounding communities. Six of the 10
participants mentioned that people in the community had circulated rumors and stories
about RML. Ms. Jackson commented, “There were rumors you would hear around town,
back in the 40s, so and so got sick with such and such. But you know you hear rumors.”
Although participants did not suggest that they believed these rumors and stories, they
expressed distrust in the information about RML that was disseminated through such
narratives.
All of the rumors and stories participants shared where about how the laboratory
had caused sickness within the community. They recounted that some stories about
laboratory workers becoming sick and other stories about community members, not
associated with the laboratory, becoming sick. For example, Mr. Green noted:
There are stories for the people that lived here long time ago. The old people that
grew up here will claim that kids, who played outside the school next to the lab—
go to a cancer study and you will find that there is a real correlation.
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Several other participants noted that such rumors were inevitably going to
circulate in the community about RML. They claimed that this was a result of the
laboratory “hiding things” as a result of RM L’s overall lack o f honesty with the public.
Ms. Moore noted “you know you hear things and things have happened in there [RML]
that they don’t—they come up, they don’t tell you about, they don’t tell anybody about.
Things like that.”
Negative Perception o f Potential IRF Risks
A third theme that characterized participants’ descriptions of their opposition was
their negative perception of risks that the BSL TV laboratory posed to public health and
safety. Participants claimed that the IRF expansion, specifically the BSL IV laboratory,
would entail a high degree of risk. Ms. Jackson noted, “Originally, there is the knee jerk
thing where you hear Biolevel IV lab— oh, my gosh what is a Biolevel IV lab?” Two
dimensions of negative risk perception were expressed by participants as characterizing
their opposition. These included their fear of the unknown and their dread in potential
events.
F ear o f the Unknown
Seven participants expressed concern about the numerous “unknowns” associated
with the BSL IV laboratory. They described the “unknowns” of the BSL IV laboratory in
terms of ambiguity o f what could happen if a biological agent was released into the
community. For example, when Ms. Brooks spoke about the event of an accidental
biological agent release, she said, “Well, we don’t know what is going to happen. We
really don’t know.”
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Participants who described the “unknowns” of the BSL IV laboratory posed the
questions as to what if a biological agent got loose? W hat would happen? How would
RM L and the comm unity respond? W hat would you do? They described their negative
risk perception as elevated because of these “unknowns”. For example, Ms. Jackson
said;
So I started researching on the internet and realized the things that they [RML and
NIH] could possibly bring in. For instance, Ebola. For instance, anthrax. For
instance, possibly small pox, even though they said they couldn’t do that by law.
So I was worried about things that they were going to bring in and what if
something got loose? W hat if the community were exposed to these things?
What if a lab worker had been exposed and contracted some disease? What if
during the expansion, the building of the project, something happened and
something was released into the river? Because they are right next to the river,
they are in the flood plain. What if some animals were injured in the building of
the project?
Participants said that as they grappled with these “unknowns”, their negative risk
perceptions about the IRF expansion increased. Additionally, participants described how
their negative risk perceptions increased since they felt RML provided few answers to
their questions about the “unknowns”. Ms. Moore noted;
It is just ridiculous. I mean we have no isolation rooms at Marcus Daly. We
can’t treat somebody with tuberculosis because the whole hospital would get
infected. So I mean, what would we do? What would you do...so I asked this
question to one o f the people there: what would you do if somebody had a
heart attack in one of the rooms [at RML]? I mean, what would you do? They
wouldn’t answer it. I don’t know, you don’t know. W ould you call life flight?
Would you want our EMS to transport them? What would you do? They didn’t
have an answer, they had no idea.
Dread in Potential Accidents
Participants often expressed dread in describing the perceived risks of a BSL IV
laboratory. Seven o f the 10 participants described how they dreaded the BSL IV
laboratory, particularly the accidental release of biological agents into the community.
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Participants noted “massive deaths” and “devastation” could happen in the community if
pathogens were released from RML. One participant, Mr. Adams, said “If they get out, it
is a catastrophic thing.” Mr. Green also noted, “There were basically just fear of germs
escaping and a massive disaster of people dying.”
Five participants expressed concern that a major accident would eventually occur.
Participants described their dread of an accidental release of an agent from RML.
Additionally, participants thought an accidental release o f an agent was inevitable. For
example, Mr. Hill commented:
But it [agent release from RML] is going to happen. We know it is going to
happen. So it is just a matter of when. And how far it goes. Is in contained or
not?
Ms. Moore also commented that an accidental release from the BSL IV was inevitable:
I think once something [agent release from RML] does happen, which I think it is
just a matter of time, five years or 35 years, or 50 years. I don’t know. But
definitely, how could it not?
Participants also speculated about what could happen in the event of an accidental
agent release from RML. Three participants, including Mr. Adams, spoke openly about
the potential outcome of potential accidents:
If it [agent release for RML] is in this little valley and an accident happens, word
gets out. They [federal government] can sterilize this valley very quickly.
They can use fuel air mixture devices and sterilize this valley and everything in it
very quickly. People say our government wouldn’t do that. Well, if you were the
president and they [government officials] came to you and said ‘it’s loose in that
valley’. We can kill 30,000 or we can allow two billion to die, what would you
do? W ould you sterilize the valley? You would have to.
Distrust in the Justification for Bioterrorism Research
A forth theme that characterized participants’ descriptions of their opposition was
distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research. Seven of the 10 participants
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described how their opposition had been characterized by skepticism of bioterrorism
research. These participants explained how they questioned the motivation behind
bioterrorism research conducted in a BSL IV laboratory. Additionally, they also
explained how they questioned the need for bioterrorism research in general.
Questioning the Motivation fo r Bioterrorism Research
One dimension of distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research was the
questioning of the motivation for bioterrorism research. These seven participants
described how they thought the “fear of terrorism”, rather than an actual threat of
terrorism, was the driving purpose of the IRF expansion.

Ms. Jackson explained:

The people that were involved in our [opposition] groups—were people who
were—may have seen or considered or thought that this [BSL IV construction]
was a knee jerk reaction and more money was being poured into it by the
government to supposedly protect us from terrorists. I think a lot of people, well
in my circle, thought that it was kind of a knee jerk reaction and that it wasn’t
really necessary. It w asn’t going to really affect us directly as far as terrorism
goes.
In addition, Mr. Green described how the IRF expansion had been based on fear:
It is actually a project that had been thought about before 9/11, but it rode in on
the back of 9/11 in some sense in terms of the rhetoric. It rode on the back of
patriotism, and the fear part of 9/11.
Mr. Hill also described how he thought fear of bioterrorism was a driving force of the
project, but he also noted that “fear of the lab wasn’t an issue” because:
It was always a fear of well now the terrorist type of activities, 9 /1 1 and type of
stuff that we [federal government] need to start doing this research for our own
safety. . . So their [RML and NIH] own side, and this is what I was having
difficulty of getting around through to them, they were using fear to push through
a BL I V . . . So they used fear to get it, but yet when it came down to fear as far as
the lab itself—safety or anything else—then that wasn’t an issue.
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Questioning the Need fo r Bioterrorism Research
As participants described how they questioned the motivation for bioterrorism
research, they also explained how they questioned the actual need for bioterrorism
research. However, participants’ beliefs that bioterrorism research was needed varied.
Three participants specifically expressed that bioterrorism research should not be done,
while two participants supported bioterrorism research. Five participants did not express
either positive or negative opinions about bioterrorism research.
Those participants that expressed bioterrorism research should not be done said
they were skeptical of what the federal government would do with the results. Primarily,
they were opposed to bioterrorism research because they feared it could be used to create
biological weapons. Mr. Davis described how he was concerned about bioterrorism
research:
I believe in good science and good research. I think RML does a lot of good stuff
over there. I can’t say I am opposed to good research, of course the problem is
when you start doing research on agents that have either been weaponized or that
are potential biological weapons. Once you start setting those organisms in that
framework, you become part of the problem. One thing is for certain in science
that information will ultimately go out and be used by somebody to hurt
somebody. I think that was what happened in the anthrax attacks. The strain of
anthrax that was used was the AIMS strain which was developed by the U.S.
military. The one bioterrorism attack that we had in our country came from
within our own country, an organism that had been engineered by our government
for biological warfare. I think that really says a lot about how we need to be
cautious in terms of the kinds of research that we do and for what reasons.
Similarly, Ms. M oore described her disapproval of bioterrorism research:
What they [RML and NIH] didn’t really say until part way through this [IRF
expansion approval process], was this is part of the homeland security deal
funding. It is not public health. It is not the public health of the United States
they are looking at, it is a defense contract. We are— they [RML scientists] are
going to be building bombs there. Or at least the technology to make them
somewhere else. And why wouldn’t they? It is just way too scary. What the
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ethics of that? I mean, come on. We [federal government] are planning on killing
people with these horrible, wretched, torturous diseases. It is awful.
However, two participants claimed that they supported bioterrorism research.
When I asked if Mr. Potter if he thought the federal government should conduct
bioterrorism research, he commented;
I 100% agree. That is why I say build it [BSL IV laboratory] in a secure location.
Go down to Nevada’s test site. We [federal government] already have all the
borders. We got the buffer zones. We got the security. There is a jillion acres out
there. Build it there. That would make sense. But we need them [BSL IV
laboratories].
Although perceptions for the need for bioterrorism research varied, most
participants claimed that their community was not an appropriate location for a BSL IV
laboratory. In fact, many participants noted that research should be conducted elsewhere,
such as in the desert or at a military facility. For example, Ms. Brooks noted the
laboratory should be located in a “protected area”;
I think Hamilton is the last place that a Biolevel four lab should be. I believe that
it needs to be in a protected area. I think it is highly inappropriate here.
Negative Perception o f th e E q u ity of IR F Expansion
In addition to distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research, a negative
perception of the equity of the IRF expansion at RML was also a prevalent theme
characterizing participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion. However, a negative
perception of equity was a unidimensional theme. Seven participants claimed that
Hamilton, M ontana was intentionally selected for the BSL IV because it was a rural
locale. Reasons that participants suggested for why rural Montana was selected included
the “rural mindset” and a sparse population.
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Participants described how it was unfair that their community was selected to host
the BSL IV laboratory simply because it was a rural area. Mr. Hill noted, “I think that
they [federal government] looked at this small community and said that this community
will be a pushover.” Participants’ often described how they perceived that their
community had been unfairly selected to host the BSL IV laboratory and how that
characterized their opposition. Ms. Moore commented:
They [federal government] strategically picked this location because of the rural
mindset. And they already have this rinky-dink little campus [RML] with extra
land they could easily acquire. You could pay off anybody in this town for their
land. So they had done that. They strategically picked this place because they
know about rural communities and the lack of our voices in numbers and in
strength and that’s why they picked it. No, 1 mean it was hideous. They didn’t
listen.
Five participants explained how their perception of equity was impacted by a NIH
internal memorandum in which reasons for why RML had been selected for the BSL IV
laboratory were listed. According to participants, this memorandum had been obtained
from the NIH by one of the opposition groups during the approval process, and it stated
that their community was intentionally selected because it was rural. Mr. Davis
explained that:
We were interested in all kinds of internal NIH documents about the lab and one
of the documents that we had was a memo from NIH that laid the rationale for
building the lab. Part of the rationale was because it was in a rural community far
removed from population centers. In the event of an accidental release of a BL
four agent, it would be minimal impact to the community as opposed to a major
metropolitan area . . . Basically it said we in this valley are pretty much
sacrificial. They [federal government] knew that, they knew they could shut this
valley down if something like that was to happen.
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Another dimension of participants’ concerns about equity was the high quality of
life in Hamilton, Montana. Four participants claimed that the community had been
selected because it was a desirable place for laboratory scientists to live compared to
other locations. Ms. Brooks theorized:
I think that the choice of putting it in Hamilton— I just feel it is an inappropriate
place for a Biolevel four lab. I know why they do it, which is it is attractive to the
PhDs that come here. The scientists want to live in a community and don’t
want to live on some base out in the middle of the desert.
Another reason that three opponents expressed as to why their community had
been intentionally selected included the possibility of containment and quarantine in the
narrow Bitterroot valley. Mr. Potter said:
I knew why they [RML and NIH] were doing it here because there are only a few
thousand of us living in the area. It would be way easy to quarantine the
Bitterroot. Heck, if up there by Missoula they just put a roadblock. There are no
roads around that.
The relatively low population in rural Montana was another reason why two
participants claimed that their community had been unfairly selected. Mr. Adams noted;
The one [biosafety laboratory] up by Boston, that one will never open as a level
four. A lot of people up there. Here, who cares? You have to sterilize 30,000
people— hey that is better than Boston or New York or Washington. They don’t
want it in their backyard. They have the votes to do it. That is why the lab is
h e re .. . It will only kill a few thousand people.
Perceived Lack o f Economic Benefits from IRF expansion
Another prevalent unidimensional theme that characterized participants’
descriptions o f their opposition to the IRF expansion was the perceived lack of economic
benefits from IRF expansion. This theme characterized three of the 10 opponents to the
IRF expansion at RML. These participants noted that laboratory proponents stressed the
economic potential of the expansion, but they claimed that the economic impact would
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not be positive for individuals or the community. For example, Mr. Smith described how
he perceived economic benefits:
In fact, they [RML and NIH] were pitching it as an economic benefit to the
community because people would be coming here to work at the lab. They would
be buying homes and paying taxes. They said these would be the impacts and so
on. . . So it w on’t have an economic benefit to the city. In fact, the impact will
probably be negative.
Similarly, Mr. Adams noted:
They hung $66 million in front of the people. If you look at a little
community like this and they [community residents] say $66 million!? But you
know they did not understand that to build that lab, it is a very specialized
company. They bring in their own materials. They bring in their own people.
Very little will be here. To put the equipment in, that all comes from somewhere
else. They send their own people to install it. They might hire, when it is all
done, hire six more people in the valley. Well that is ridiculous but that is the
way it is. Sixty-five of that 66 million will go out of state.
On the other hand, three opponents claimed that the laboratory expansion would
provide economic benefits to the community. However, they described how they
disregarded potential economic benefits because of perceived “problems” that could
result from the expansion. For example, Mr. Hill said “Not that it won’t be really
beneficial for the economy having this type of workforce here, but the risk.” Mr. Potter
expressed similar concerns:
W hy should they [community residents] be in favor of it? Yeah, it brings— there
are some benefits— like these intelligent people come in and there are the benefits
of the payroll. That is hard to see and pretty evident with some of problems.
Especially potential problems.
Conclusion
Overall, several themes were found to characterize participants’ opposition to the
IRF expansion at RML. These multidimensional themes included a negative perception
of the IRF expansion approval process, distrust in institutional authority, a negative
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perception of potential IRF risks, and distrust in the justification for bioterrorism
research. Unidimensional themes included a negative perception of the equity o f IRF
expansion and a perceived lack of economic benefits from IRF expansion. However, the
extent to which each theme reportedly influenced each participant’s opposition varied.
As a result, the opposition movement, particularly within and between opposition groups,
was not unified. For example, Mr. Potter explained:
So, our organization was sort of split. There were people that were just very
opposed to the whole concept of doing biological warfare research. Then others
were not so concerned about the actual project but were very concerned that at
least the law would be followed in terms of developing an environmental impact
statement and following the NEPA process. So some of it was philosophical and
some of it had to do with the la w .. . We thought that we didn’t have agreement in
our organization so we thought it would be best just to stick to being a watchdog
group and insuring the NIH followed all of the environmental regulations that
were required for a project of this magnitude.
The lack of unification across the general opposition movement was also apparent
between opposition groups. As Mr. Green explained, opposition groups had reached a
compromise before mediation with the NIH in part because of their fragmented opposing
views towards the IRF expansion:
[Opposition group] wanted the NEPA process and the other groups wanted it
gone. [Opposition groups] were really concerned about the objective of the
outcome and [other opposition group] were interested in the process outcome.
That became a big conflict in the end when the compromise came. Cause you had
to give up the NEPA in order to get an objective compromise.
In conclusion, although a variety of themes were found to characterize opposition
to the IRF expansion at RML, the extent to which each theme reportedly influenced
participants’ opposition varied. This variation in opposition is discussed in the next
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chapter. The implications of this opposition to the IRF expansion at RML are also
framed in the context of addressing whether opposition to a biolaboratory supports what
is known about a community response to a high risk hazardous facility.
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CHAPTER SIX- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The m ajor research question addressed in this study was whether a biolaboratory
is perceived to be a high risk hazardous facility by community members of Hamilton,
Montana. Since 1927, RM L in Hamilton has pursued scientific infectious disease
research funded by the federal government. The current IRF expansion project at RML,
which will include a BSL IV research laboratory, is funded by bioterrorism monies
appropriated to the NIAID in 2001. In the BSL IV laboratory, scientists will be able to
study the most deadly infectious diseases, some which may be potential bioterrorism
weapons.
Therefore, the IRF expansion project at RML, which will include a BSL IV
laboratory, was considered a representative case of a high risk biolaboratory for
exploration. As the early and recent history of RML summarized in this study has
demonstrated, some residents in Hamilton and the surrounding communities have viewed
RM L over the past 80 years as a high risk hazardous facility. In this study, the factors
characterizing community opposition to the most recent expansion at RML are reviewed.
Similarly, this study addressed what themes might describe community opposition
to a biolaboratory as a high risk hazardous facility and whether these themes might
correspond to the key factors that previously have been found to explain community
opposition to other types of high risk hazardous facilities. Although community
opposition to high risk hazardous facilities has been widely examined, residents’
perceptions of biolaboratories, as another type o f a high risk hazardous facility, have not
yet been explored. This exploratory study aimed to examine if themes characterizing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70
participants’ opposition to a biolaboratory reflected the factors previously identified in
studies of other high risk hazardous facilities.
RM L as a High Risk Hazardous Facility
Several key events have historically characterized a view by many Bitterroot
Valley residents that RM L is a high risk hazardous facility. Before the establishment of
RML, early spotted fever research was a dangerous endeavor in the Bitterroot Valley
because of the high mortality rate. Over a period of 16 years of early spotted fever
research, five researchers became infected with the disease and died (Philips 2000). In
the early 1900s, local ranchers resisted tick eradication efforts as they destroyed with
dynamite two arsenic dipping vats designed to eradicate ticks from the valley’s cattle
population (Philips 2000). Additionally, two local residents employed by the state to
operate arsenic dipping vats died as they contracted spotted fever during this dangerous
operation (Philips 2000).
In 1927, laboratory construction of a new spotted fever research facility in
Hamilton, Montana was strongly opposed by local residents. Concerned residents feared
that ticks with spotted fever would escape the facility, and threaten residents’ health.
Local residents opposed to the laboratory construction viewed it as a high risk hazardous
facility. Although the laboratory was eventually built, resident fears were reportedly
alleviated by the construction of a small, water-filled moat around the facility that would
prevent ticks from escaping the laboratory.
As the history of RML reveals, the recent opposition to the IRF expansion is not
the first time community residents’ have opposed laboratory plans. RML, which local
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residents refer to as the “tick lab”, has been viewed as a high risk hazardous facility by
many residents of the Bitterroot Valley for numerous years.
Themes Characterizing Opposition to the IRF Expansion at RML
The complex and interrelated factors characterizing opposition to high risk
hazardous facilities in communities have been widely examined. Themes that
participants expressed in describing their opposition to the IRF expansion at RML
reflected factors that previously have been found to explain negative responses to
proposed and existing high risk hazardous facilities. The themes found to characterize
participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML include a negative perception of
the IRF expansion approval process, distrust in institutional authority, a negative
perception of potential IRF risks, distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research, a
negative perception of the equity of IRF expansion, and a perceived lack of economic
benefits from IRF expansion.
Other studies have found that very similar factors including distrust, risk
perception, equity, and a perceived lack of economic benefits characterize opposition to
other types of high risk facilities (Murdock et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998). Thus, this
study reflects the prior literature that has examined opposition to other types of high risk
hazardous facilities. However, participants’ negative perception of the IRF expansion
approval process as a major theme characterizing their opposition stood out as a more
prevalent factor than the community participation factor previously found in other studies
(Murdoch et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998; Wakefield and Elliot 2000). Additionally, unlike
the previous literature, participants’ distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research
was a unique theme that emerged in this study.
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Sim ilar Findings to Previous Literature
Four them es characterizing participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML
are similar to the factors of distrust, risk perception, equity, and perceived lack of
economic benefits found in the prior literature.
Distrust
Previous studies have found that distrust in high risk hazardous facility
management and technology experts impacts residents’ opposition to such facilities
(Albrecht, Amey and Amir 1996; Couch and Kroll-Smith 1994; Flynn et al. 1992;
Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Sjoberg 2004; Wakefield and Elliot 2000). In this
study, distrust was a theme found to characterize participants’ descriptions of their
opposition to the IRF expansion at RML. The dimensions of distrust that characterized
participants’ expression of opposition to the IRF expansion included distrust in laboratory
scientists at RML, distrust in the federal government, and distrust in information about
RM L as sources of reliable information were often rumors and stories.
Like residents in previous communities studied, participants doubted the
infallibility of RML scientists in insuring laboratory safety. As Mr. Hill noted, “Humans
make mistakes all the time. And we are always going to. ” Thus, participants felt that
human error by laboratory scientists was inevitable, and their distrust was magnified by
RM L claims o f infallibility. Participants’ opposition was also characterized by distrust in
the federal government. This dimension was reportedly contextualized within a broader
distrust of the federal government. For example, Mr. Potter said, “You are right we don’t
trust the government. W e know what they [federal government] do. We can see it on TV
and read about in the paper.’’ In addition, distrust of the federal government was fostered
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by participants’ negative perception of how the IRF approval process was handled by the
NIH. This was evident when participants suggested that the government was “hiding
things” and “going through the motions” during the IRF approval process.
One additional dimension of distrust found in this study has not been identified in
the findings of previous literature. Participants expressed distrust in information about
RM L because sources of reliable information were often rumors and stories. Compared
to other studies of high risk hazardous facilities, this is a unique dimension of distrust that
is embedded within the RM L’s long historical presence within the community. Other
studies have not found this to be a dimension of distrust characterizing residents’
opposition to high risk hazardous facilities. I suggest this finding may be due to the
increased bureaucracy, primarily in hiring more employees, and residents’ perceptions of
decreased transparency at RML. Currently, over 250 people are employed at RML and
the laboratory is not open to the public. Therefore, rumors and stories that circulate about
RM L exist as residents speculate about the unknown research that is conducted by
unfam iliar scientists taking place in their community.
Risk Perception
In addition to distrust, previous studies have also found that a negative risk
perception affects residents’ opposition to high risk hazardous facilities (Bourke 1994;
Flynn et al. 1992; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Krannich and Albrecht 1995;
Spies et al. 1998). This study also found that a negative risk perception characterized
participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML. This theme was characterized by
two dimensions, including dread of potential accidents and a fear of the unknown.
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Participants’ risk perceptions were strongly characterized by their dread of a
potentially devastating biological agent release from the laboratory. Similarly, other
studies of community response to high risk hazardous facilities have found that residents
dread potential accidents and the ensuing contamination to public health (Bassett,
Jenkins-Smith and Silva 1996) and the environment (Albrecht el al. 1996; Baxter, Eyles
and Elliott 1999; Krannich & Albrecht 1995). Participants described their dread of an
accidental release of these deadly biological agents. In this study, dread of the IRF
expansion at RML is apparent because the biological agents that can be studied in a BSL
IV laboratory are extremely deadly. For example, Ms. Moore noted, “Any BSL four
agent [release] would be devastating, absolutely devastating.”
Another dimension of negative risk perception found to characterize participants’
opposition was a fear of the unknown. This theme was closely related to participants’
dread of an accidental biological release since participants feared the unknown outcome
of an accidental biological release. Similarly, risk perception studies have found that
people perceive hazardous facilities as unknown risks (Slovic 1987). Participants’ fears
o f the unknown were characterized by uncertainty about what could happen in the event
o f a biological agent release from the BSL FV laboratory. In this study, fear of the
unknown was a prevalent dimension of negative risk perception because biological
agents found in a BSL IV laboratory are very high risk since these deadly diseases cannot
yet be cured. Additionally, participants’ fears of the unknown were elevated when their
safety questions about potential releases were not adequately answered in the IRF
approval process. For instance, Ms. Moore noted, ‘T hey [RML and NIH] didn’t have an
answer [to questions]. They had no idea.”
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Equity
Equity issues were another result from this study that reflects findings from
previous studies of high risk hazardous facilities (Albrecht et. al 1996; Jenkins-Smith and
Kunreuther 2001; M urdoch et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998). Participants’ opposition was
characterized by a perception that their community was intentionally selected because it
is a rural locale. This finding reflects results from previous studies, but in this study, the
theme of equity is less multidimensional. Equity factors that have been found to
influence community opposition to high risk hazardous facilities include the beliefs that
the community has been targeted because it is poor and ethnic as well as rural (Albrecht
et. al 1996). However, this study did not find that equity issues of ethnicity or class were
salient themes characterizing participants’ opposition to the ERF expansion at RML.
Rather, rurality emerged as the primary equity dimension characterizing
participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML. While many other high risk
hazardous facilities are primarily located in rural areas, no other biolaboratories are yet
located in rural areas so that RML is the first rural locale hosting a BSL IV laboratory.
Participants’ descriptions of the equity question about siting a BSL IV laboratory in their
community included the perception that Hamilton had been intentionally selected by the
federal government because of its rural location. Participants’ perceptions of the inequity
were magnified by the NIH internal memorandum that explained why their rural
community had been identified to host the BSL IV laboratory. Rurality also emerged as
the primary equity factor characterizing participants’ opposition in part because of their

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76
distrust of the federal government. As Ms. Brooks noted, “People back East [in the
United States] don’t even think that Montana is in the same country. In a small town of
M ontana, we are so expendable.”
Perceived L ack o f Economic Benefits
Previous studies have found that residents’ perceived lack of economic benefits
from high risk hazardous facilities impacts their opposition (Bourke 1994; Krannich and
Albrecht 1995; Murdock et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998). Similarly, this study also found
that some participants characterized their opposition in terms of a perceived lack of
economic benefits in noting that any possible potential economic benefits of the IRF
would be offset by the perceived costs associated with the IRF expansion. Perceived
costs o f the IRF expansion primarily included the accidental release of a BSL FV
biological agent. As Mr. Potter noted, “But when something bad happens, it’s like way
bad . . . but if it does go wrong, what is the price we have to pay for that? It could very
steep.” In this study, participants perceived the costs associated with the IRF expansion
at RM L as outweighing any potential economic benefits.
In sum, four of the themes from this study reflect the results of prior literature
examining opposition to other types of high risk hazardous facilities. Additionally, two
themes from this study are unique and do not reflect findings from the prior literature of
community response to high risk hazardous facilities.
Unique Findings
Two unique themes were found to characterize participants’ opposition to the
biolaboratory expansion. These themes included a negative perception of the IRF
expansion approval process and distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research.
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Participants’ perceptions o f the approval process stood out as a more prevalent theme
than related factors like community participation that have been previously found in other
studies examining community response to high risk hazardous facilities (Murdoch et
al.l999; Spies et al. 1998; W akefield and Elliot 2000). In contrast to the previous
literature, participants’ distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research was a unique
theme that emerged in this study.
Negative Perception o f the IRF Approval Process
Negative perception of the IRF approval process was a stronger theme in this
study than the related factor of attitudes toward community participation identified in the
previous literature. Previous studies have found that residents have been generally
satisfied with the public process of approving high risk hazardous facilities (Murdoch et
al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998; W akefield and Elliott 2000). However, participants in this
study reflected strong dissatisfaction with the IRF expansion public participation process.
Negative perception of the public process was the most prevalent theme found to
characterize participants’ descriptions of their opposition to the IRF expansion at RML.
Negative perception of the public process was found to be a multidimensional theme,
which included their perception of a predetermined outcome, their concern with
unaddressed safety issues, their experience with unanswered questions, and a sense of
feeling powerless.
I suggest that this theme, to a certain extent, may be due to local community
culture. In this remote corner o f Montana, local citizens have a strong history of
grassroots protest and organizing. In the case of the proposed IRF expansion, Bitterroot
Valley residents have historically protested decisions regarding the establishment and
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o peration o f R M L. F o r exam ple, in the early 1900s, local ranchers destroyed arsenic vats
designed b y entom ologists to eradicate ticks from the v alley ’s cattle population to curb
the spread o f spotted fever. L ater, in 1927, over 40 0 residents in the B itterroot V alley
opposed th e initial construction o f R M L in H am ilton. In addition to R M L centered
protests, residents o f the B itterroot Valley have m ore recently engaged in a series o f
controversies including the state’s expansion o f M ontana State H ighw ay 93, B itterroot
N ational F o rest land m anagem ent policies, county grow th m anagem ent policies, and
grizzly b e ar réintroduction by the U.S. Fish and W ildlife Service.
A s frequent protestors, local citizens in the B itterroot V alley, especially
environm ental groups, are fam iliar with national environm ental law s, especially the
N ational E nvironm ental Policy A ct (NEPA ). E nvironm ental groups played a key
leadership role in the overall opposition m ovem ent against the IR F expansion at RM L.
Individuals from these groups w ere fam iliar and experienced with the N EPA process and
w ere able to assist, and to som e extent, lead the opposition m ovem ent. Although
participants in this study had not previously been involved with a biolaboratory
expansion approval process, they w ere fam iliar w ith the NEPA process.
In addition to particip an ts’ fam iliarity w ith the N EPA process, their negative
p erceptions o f the approval process were im pacted by their belief that NIH did not
adequately follow the N E PA process. For exam ple, M r. Potter said, “N IH apparently had
n ev er done an EIS before because it really is one o f the lam est EIS im aginable. They did
som e things that are ju st blatantly illegal.” Thus, participants’ belief that the N EPA
process w as not adequately follow ed by NIH was a key elem ent in shaping their distrust.
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D istru st in the Ju stification f o r B ioterrorism Research
In addition to the stronger prevalence o f a negative perception o f the IR F public
process, p articip an ts’ d istru st in the justification for bioterrorism research was a unique
them e that em erged in this study. T his them e had not been identified in previous studies
as a factor ch aracterizing com m unity response to a high risk hazardous facility. D istrust
in the ju stification for bioterrorism research em erged as a m ultidim ensional them e
characterizing particip an t’s opposition to the IRF expansion. The dim ensions o f the
them e included participants questioning both the m otivation behind and also the need for
bioterrorism research. P articipants questioned the m otivation for bioterrorism research
w hen they explained that a fear o f bioterrorism in general, rather than an actual terrorist
threat was the m ajor reason for the IR F expansion. H ow ever, participants’ responses
varied regarding the need for bioterrorism research. Som e participants supported
bioterrorism research w hile others did not.
D istrust in the justificatio n for bioterrorism research is a unique them e in this
study o f a com m unity response to a biolaboratory because this type of facility is equipped
w ith the unique technology to pursue bioterrorism research. Thus, since other high risk
hazardous facilities do not conduct bioterrorism research, it has not been found to
characterize opposition to oth er high risk hazardous facilities. I suggest that this them e,
and the am biguity o f p articip an ts’ view s o f bioterrorism , is a direct response to the
terrorist attacks occurring on S eptem ber 11, 2001 and the ensuing nation-w ide fear o f
terrorism . A lthough terrorism is not entirely new, this type of terrorism , including
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co m m ercial airplanes as w eapons and biological o r chem ical attacks, is particularly
dreaded and am biguous. T hus, it appears that terrorism has em erged as “a new species o f
tro u b le” (S lovic 2002).
P articipants in m y study had to grapple w ith terrorism as “a new species o f
tro u b le” and the institutionalizing o f bioterrorism research in their com m unity. T o som e
extent, th eir reaction to bioterrorism research m ay have been m ixed because bioterrorism
is a relativ ely new phenom enon. Participants w ho opposed bioterrorism research also
resisted the institutionalizing o f risk because these agents could be m isused by the federal
governm ent. M r. Potter noted, “I think w e have som e crazy people running this country
and it w ould not be beyond them to m isuse the research that is com ing out of there
[R M L ].” T hus, these particip an ts’ stance against bioterrorism research was prim arily
shaped b y th eir distrust in the federal governm ent and w hat federal officials could do
w ith b ioterrorism agents or research.
P articipants w ho supported bioterrorism research expressed a perspective that
reflected the N IM B Y syndrom e (Fitchen 1991; Portney 1991). They approved of
b ioterrorism research, as long as it w as not conducted in their com m unity. A s Mr.
A dam s noted, “A level four lab belongs in a place like dow n at the N evada Test site.
Som eplace like that w here there is 80 m iles o f buffer zone betw een w here the public can
get to and w here the lab is.” M ost p articipants’ perspectives often reflected the N IM B Y
syndrom e since m ost participants did not w ant the B SL IV laboratory located in their
com m unity. Som e participants rejected not only for their own com m unity, but other
potential locales that m ay be affected by biolaboratories. T hus, to som e extent, they
ju stifie d th eir N IM B Y response in their expressed opposition to setting precedence for
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future c o m m u n ities’ encounters w ith proposed biolaboratories. M r. D avis said, “If we
d o n ’t h o ld th em [N IH ] to a standard . . . if they get aw ay with it, w hat happens to N EPA ?
T h is is for o th er p e o p le ’s backyard.”
F ra g m en ted O p p osition to the IR F E xp ansion
P a rticip an ts’ descriptions o f their opposition to the ERF expansion at R M L were
ch aracterized by several them es; how ever, the extent to which each them e influenced
each p a rticip a n t’s opposition varied. T hus, the descriptions o f opposition to the IRF
expansion varied and w ere som ew hat fragm ented.
T h eir fragm ented descriptions m ay be partially explained by participants’
difficulty in “fram ing” their opposition (B enford and Snow 2000). Fram es are “actionorientated sets o f beliefs and m eanings that inspire and legitim ate the activities and
cam paigns o f social m ovem ent organization” (B enford and Snow 2000:614). In this
study, a v ariety o f fram es seem ed to support participants’ opposition to the IR F
expansion at R M L. E very participant’s opposition w as characterized by a unique
narrative discourse in expressing the m ost prevalent them es. Som e o f the participants did
not w ant the expansion to occur at all, w hile others only w anted to ensure that the public
process w as adequately follow ed. T hus, the “m aster fram e”, or the general and prim ary
focus o f the opposition, w as not well defined by the m ovem ent (Benford and Snow

2000 ).
A dditionally, the opposition groups varied in their position about the IRF
expansion. Previously established local environm ental groups struggled to fram e their
opposition to the IR F expansion. M r. G reen noted, “ [O rganization name] is painted as a
[environm ental issue], so any tim e you get out o f that core thing that brought them
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[organization m em bers] together they w ere split over i t . . . T hey w ere kind o f split. They
d id n ’t w ant to be anti-lab.” T hus, to som e extent, previously established local
environm ental groups struggled to fram e their opposition because the IRF expansion at
R M L w as a new issue that challenged the boundaries o f their existing organization’s
m ission and purpose. T hus, fram ing o f the issue by opposition groups was disjointed.
T he fragm ented opposition m ay also be explained by the unfam iliarity o f the
b iolaboratory and bioterrorism issues. A lthough R M L has been operating w ithin the
com m unity fo r over 80 years, a biolaboratory expansion approval process has not
recently occurred. R esidents, to som e extent, w ere unfam iliar w ith biolaboratories and
the technology involved w ith B SL IV laboratories. O pposition groups that becam e
involved w ith this issue w ere not fam iliar with other biolaboratory expansions.
A dditionally, the threat o f bioterrorism and the institutionalizing o f bioterrorism research
is a relatively new phenom enon. B ecause o f these unfam iliar issues, uncertainty about
th eir significance and im pact locally in the B itterroot V alley created the fragm ented
opposition.
O pp osition T ran sform ation into A cceptance o f the IR F E xpansion
F or com m unities affected by high risk hazardous facilities, it has been suggested
that resid en ts’ experience the “process o f negotiation” (W ulfhorst 2000). D uring this
process, residents m ove beyond opposing a high risk hazardous facility and begin to
accept and fam iliarize them selves w ith the new facility. Follow ing W ulfhorst (2000), I
suggest that participants in this study experienced a transform ation from opposition to the
IR F expansion to an unw illing acceptance of the B SL IV laboratory. Ms. Jackson
com m ented, “ In the beginning it w as an opposition . . . I personally was too—totally
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o pposed to it [IR F ex p an sio n ]—and I did not w ant to see that happen here. As tim e w ent
on, m y view s, m y attitudes—m aybe not m y view s—changed. I ’m still opposed to it but
m y attitudes tow ard the reality o f it happening changed.”
T his acceptance m ay be due to their negative perceptions o f the public process
and that the IR F expansion at R M L w as a predeterm ined outcom e. M s. B rooks noted,
“W e fought as hard as w e could. T hen w e ju st, som e o f us ju st threw in the towel and
w ent ho m e.” A dditionally, participants m ay have begun to accept the IR F expansion
because o f R M L ’s long historical presence in the com m unity. Thus, they perceived only
a slim p o ssibility that R M L w ould cease to exist in the com m unity.
A lthough particip an ts’ opposition to the IR F expansion at R M L was transform ed
into an acceptance, it seem ed this acceptance w as only a final resignation to the
inevitability o f the outcom e. T hus, participants “settled” for safety concessions from
NIH . M s. Peterson said, “W e honestly co u ld n ’t go into m ediation saying ‘we don ’t w ant
the lab e v e r’ standpoint. T here is nothing we could gain at that point.”
P articip an ts’ transform ation from an opposition into an acceptance o f the IRF
expansion w as difficult. M r. H ill com m ented, “As far as that part [outcom e], it was kind
o f disheartening. Y ou know , to do all that work and see it ju st kind o f swept under the
c arp et.” P articipants struggled to accept the futility of their resistance. For exam ple, Ms.
Jackson said, “A s soon as the record o f decision was out, it was like okay. I had com e to
that reality. I knew it w as going to happen. I w as done. I am done, I am done. I have
put in m y tim e and I’ve done everything I could possibly do.” T hus, although
p articip an ts’ opposition transform ed into an acceptance o f the IR F expansion, it was a
troublesom e process.
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L im ita tio n s o f the S tu d y
T he first lim itation o f this study is that I only explored the perspectives o f those
o pposed to the IR F expansion at R M L. A lthough the perspectives o f those opposed to
the o p p o sitio n are im portant in understanding residents’ reactions to a biolaboratory
expansion, these only represent a particular selection o f the w ide variety o f possible
perspectives. H ence, this exploration ignores the perspectives o f those who supported the
IR F ex p an sio n at RM L. An exploration o f the perspectives o f those supporting the IRF
expansion w ould provide a m ore in-depth and broader understanding o f a com m unity’s
response to a biolaboratory expansion. Furtherm ore, an exploration o f other points o f
view could increase the understanding o f how and w hy p eople’s perspectives o f a
biolaboratory expansion m ay vary.
A n o th er lim itation o f this study is the sm all num ber o f participants interview ed.
O nly 10 residents opposed to the biolaboratory expansion were interview ed in this study.
T his sm all num ber lim its m y ability to generalize the findings o f this study to represent
all o f those opposed to the biolaboratory expansion. A dditionally, it lim its my ability to
generalize the findings o f this study to residents’ reactions to biolaboratories and other
types o f high risk hazardous facilities in sim ilar com m unities. Furtherm ore, since my
participants w ere selected through snow ball sam pling, I do not know if my sam ple
adequately represents all residents o f the com m unity that were opposed to the IRF
expansion at RM L.
In addition to a sm all num ber o f participants, another lim itation of this study was
that the d ata w ere collected after the IR F expansion approval process had been
com pleted. D ata for this study w ere collected from A ugust to N ovem ber, 2005. The
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d ecisio n to b u ild the IR F expansion had already been announced in June, 2004 and the
settlem en t b etw een opposition groups and the N IH had been reached in Septem ber, 2004.
T h u s, nearly one year had passed w hen I collected the data for this study. This m ay have
influenced p a rtic ip a n ts’ m em ories and descriptions o f their opposition to the IRF
expansion.
C on clu sion
T he p urpose o f this study w as to explore w hether a biolaboratory is perceived as a
high risk h azardous facility. The response o f participants in this study to the
b iolaboratory expansion reflects, to som e degree, the com m unity response o f residents to
o th er proposed or existing high risk hazardous facilities. Like com m unity responses to
other high risk hazardous facilities, this study found biolaboratories elicit distrust,
n egative risk perceptions, negative equity perceptions, and a perceived lack of econom ic
benefits. H ow ever, as a different type o f high risk hazardous facility, this study also
found a unique com m unity response to biolaboratories in participants strong negative
perceptions o f the public process and distrust in the justification for bioterrorism
research. T hus, I conclude that based on the them es characterizing opposition to the IRF
expansion at RM L, that biolaboratories are perceived to be another type o f a high risk
hazardous facility.
E rikson (1994) has suggested that society is plagued by a “new species o f
trouble” that is characterized by technological disasters that provoke dread and
uncertainty. A re biolaboratories becom ing a “new species of trouble” ? B iolaboratories
are institutions that com bat infectious diseases. A s I discovered in this study,
bioterrorism research has been incorporated into the purpose of biolaboratories. This
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institutionalization o f b io terro rism reportedly w ill decrease risks associated with possible
b ioterrorism attacks. H ow ever, as this study also revealed, the institutionalization o f
bioterrorism research is no t a risk-free endeavor. N ew risks, such as a possible terrorist
attacks on a biolaboratory, release o f a deadly biological agent into a host com m unity, or
the potential for bio terro rism research to create biological w eapons, m ay em erge from the
institutionalization o f bioterrorism research. Thus, this study has found that
biolaboratories, as an u nexplored type o f high risk hazardous facility, indeed m ay be
considered a “new species o f trouble.”
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A p p en d ix A . B SL description (N IA ID 2004b).
B SL-1 labs are used to study agents not know n to consistently cause disease in
health y adults. They follow basic safety procedures and require no special equipm ent or
d esign features.
B S L -2 labs are used to study m oderate-risk agents that pose a danger if
accid en tally inhaled, sw allow ed or exposed to the skin. Safety m easures include the use
o f gloves and eyew ear as w ell as hand w ashing sinks and w aste decontam ination
facilities.
B S L -3 labs are used to study agents that can be transm itted through the air and
cause p o ten tially lethal infection. R esearchers perform lab m anipulations in a gas-tight
enclosure. O ther safety features include clothing decontam ination, sealed w indow s, and
specialized ventilation system s.
B S L -4 labs are used to study agents that pose a high risk o f life-threatening
disease for w hich no vaccine or therapy is available. Lab personnel are required to w ear
full-body, air-supplied suits and to show er when exiting the facility. The labs incorporate
all B S L 3 features and occupy safe, isolated zones w ithin a larger building.
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A p p en d ix B . B itterroot V alley P opu lation and spotted fever cases (Figures
d ocum ented by P hilip 2000).
Y ear

Population

Spotted fever cases

1870

370

1

1880

1222

16

1890

3,950

83

1900

7,822

141

1910

11,666

86

1920

10,207

37

1930

11,647

39

1940

13,040

8

1950

12,721

1

1960

12,341

4

1970

14,409

11
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A p p en d ix C. In terview G uide.

1. W h en you first heard about the R M L expansion, how did you react to the new s?
P robe: C an you describe how /w hen you heard about the proposal?
2. W h at w as your biggest concern w ith the expansion project?
Probe: W hat w ere som e other concerns you had?
3. W h at did you do to express your concerns?
Probe: D id you jo in an opposition group? H ow and w hen did you get involved?
Probe: H ow w ould you describe your involvem ent with this group?
Probe: W hat w as the group’s view point o f the R M L upgrade?
4. C an you describe your view point o f the R M L expansion project?
Probe: D id you opinion change at all over tim e? In what w ays?
P robe: H ow w as upgrade approval process handled by RM L?
5. B efore this lab expansion issue began, how did you feel about the lab?
Probe: D o you rem em ber the last upgrade to a B L 3?
Probe: D id the events o f Septem ber 11 im pact your personal response to the lab
ex pansion? In w hat w ays?
6.

H ow has the expansion approval process im pacted the com m unity?

7. Is there anything else that is im portant you w ould like to m ention?
I am try in g to represent all those w hom I should in this study. Is there anyone you
m ight suggest I talk to?
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